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ABSTRACT
HYPERBOREAN HABITS AND MELTING ICE: THE NORMALIZATION OF ARCTIC
SPACE AND RESURGENT NATIONAL IDENTITY
Ian Birdwell
Old Dominion University, 2019
Director: Dr. Regina C. Karp

The Arctic Council has a robust history of fostering cooperation among its members on a
host of environmental and scientific objectives. Yet, as the region has warmed the formerly
inaccessible region has become ever easier to access, and Arctic politics are becoming of greater
interest to the global community. In the midst significant change of this the network created by
the Arctic Council continues to advance its cooperative agenda, though increasingly it seems to
be experiencing setbacks due to the surges of nationalistic rhetoric on the part of its members.
What best explains the transformation of national attitudes and how will such a transformation
affect the future of Arctic politics? This paper argues the national identities of Arctic states limits
the ability of the Arctic Council to create policy inroads into the national interests of its members
in key identity-linked areas such as national defense, resource extraction, and territorial disputes.
This propagates a normalization of Arctic politics, shifting the formerly unique hyperborean
political system into something more readily resembling the interactions of Arctic states below
the Arctic Circle. This is accomplished through a histographical analysis of Arctic Council
policy recommendations, domestic political developments, and international relationships since
1989 between the Arctic Council and the two most nationalistic Arctic states, Russia and
Canada. Ultimately, Arctic Council recommendations on issues linked to traditionally
cooperative areas such as scientific cooperation and conservation do experience successful

integration into member states; however, closely related to power national interests are neglected
by states in favor of the pursuit of those interests.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
For nearly the whole of human history, the Arctic has lain as a frigid realm nearly
impervious to most Ocean-going traffic. However, for the first time in human history that is
changing. Climate change has begun to cause climate of the Polar Regions to warm, shrinking
the sea ice serving as the primary impediment to travel at the poles, and states from all over the
world first began to take action to study, mitigate, and ultimately prevent these kinds of regional
transformation over thirty years ago.1 After the discovery in the hole of the ozone layer above
Antarctica, the international community rallied together to limit the production of CFCs and to
prevent further harm to the Ozone Layer.2 This effort culminated in the Montreal Protocol of
1989, cementing the efforts of the international community into a legally binding document.
Though this work proved monumental in solving a problem for the whole of the global
community, it also served to highlight a lack of action done to address ongoing problems and a
lack of study of the unique Arctic environment much closer to home for several of the signatories
of the Montreal Protocol. To this end, a series of international research agreements, cooperative
arrangements, and collective effort created the Arctic Council.3
Today, the Arctic Council serves as the most prominent and important regional institution
for Arctic issues, creating new habits of interaction among its members on topics such as human
development, environmental management, scientific coordination, sustainable economic

1

C. Keskitalo, "International Region-Building - Development of the Arctic as an International Region,"
Cooperation and Conflict 42, no. 2 (2007). 190
2
United Nations Ozone Secretariat, "Handbook for the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone
Layer," ed. United Nations Environment Programme (Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Ozone Secretariat, 2018).
3
S. Knecht, "The Politics of Arctic International Cooperation: Introducing a Dataset on Stakeholder Participation in
Arctic Council Meetings, 1998-2015," Cooperation and Conflict 52, no. 2 (2017).
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development, and search and rescue operations.4 The most prominent acclaim the Arctic Council
has to offer though comes in the form of its climate research, reports like the Arctic Climate
Impact Assessment of 2004 and its later successor reports paint a picture of an Arctic continuing
to warm with melting sea ice opening the region for commercial traffic and other economic
activity.5 The publication of these reports has done more than highlight the ongoing issues of the
Arctic region related to climate change though; those reports have served to reignite the
discourse of the Arctic in every major Arctic state.
While the precipitation of discussions on the Arctic is important for the study and
preservation of the Arctic climate, the Arctic represents a politicized region in the national
identity in nearly every Arctic Coastal states fueling several of the ongoing Arctic Coastal state
territorial disputes. Moreover, the national ideas on the Arctic range from a kind of manifest
destiny regarding long desired trade routes and resource extraction rights, sometimes in those
same disputed zones.6 As the ice has melted the contestations and disagreements of the Arctic
have boiled to the forefront into the popular consciousness on the Arctic region, disrupting some
of the established habits present within the Arctic region.7
Thus, given the amount of interest within the Arctic region throughout the global
community, the nationalistic approaches advocated within several Arctic states, and the
increasingly possible reality of an ice-free commercial Arctic layered on top of a region
previously considered to be a geopolitical backwater it is important to examine the overall
4

The Arctic Council, "Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council: Joint Communique of the
Governments of the Arctic Countries on the Establishment of the Arctic Council," (Ottawa, Canada: Arctic Council,
1996).
5
Klaus Dodds, "Flag Planting and Finger Pointing: The Law of the Sea, the Arctic and the Political Geographies of
the Outer Continental Shelf," Political Geography (2010).
6
I. A. Medby, "Articulating State Identity: 'Peopling' the Arctic State," ibid.62 (2018). 117
7
Kathryn Isted, "Sovereignty in the Arctic: An Analysis of Territorial Disputes & Environmental Policy
Considerations," Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 18 (2008). 344
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effectiveness of the Arctic Council in developing a community of states.8 Therefore, in order to
examine the effectiveness of the Arctic Council in developing a cooperative community at the
top of the world it is vital to propose the research question under what conditions can the Arctic
Council facilitate cooperative policy developments in its members?
In order to answer the research query it is important to propose the hypothesis of the
national identity of member states limits the ability of the Arctic Council to affect cooperative
policy change. To adequately test this hypothesis we must analyze the null hypothesis of the
national identity of member states does not impact the ability of the Arctic Council to affect
cooperative policy change. The best course of action to analyze the null hypothesis is to first
contextualize the Arctic region in global politics, next detail how the current literature has
addressed the Arctic Council, third review the analytical methods, then scrutinize the policy
decisions of Canada and Russia in interacting with the Arctic Council, before finally
reconsidering the research question. Because, though it appears that the Arctic Council has
successfully developed a community of states increasingly concerned with the environmental
status of the region and willing to cooperate on conservation and scientific research critically
important areas related to hard power development in the region are largely being ignored by the
Council and its members. Instead it appears a normalization of relations is taking place, where
the previously prevailing policy priorities of the Arctic states are being changed to become
similar to those same states policy priorities to interstate relations outside of the unique
environment of the Arctic region.

8
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CHAPTER 2
ARCTIC CONTEXTUALIZATION

Figure 1: Arctic Ice Melt

In 1818 there were two things on every Londoner’s mind, the Ross expedition and
Frankenstein.9 The narrative gripped Londoners with its portrayal of humanity and also for its
relevance to public conscientiousness at the time. Frankenstein is bookended by chapters set in
the Arctic and was published just weeks before the famous 1st Ross expedition for the Northwest

9

M. J. Ross, Polar Pioneers : John Ross and James Clark Ross (Montreal ; Buffalo: McGill-Queen's University
Press, 1994).
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Passage of Canada.10 Ross’s expeditions cemented the status of the Arctic as a mysterious place
where not even the mighty British navy could surmount the elements and left a profound
impression on the British and European consciousness. The Ross expedition imparted a lasting
impression of the Arctic as a realm of adventure, danger, scientific discovery, and exploration
without the geopolitical significance to affect the politics among nations which had been
imparted to other regions of the world.11
This image of the Arctic would only begin to change during the 20th century with the
development of the radio, nuclear deterrence, powerful icebreakers, and other specialized
technologies.12 Moreover, as the planet warms due to climate change the Arctic has begun to
gain strategic significance for both the states with coastlines on the ocean and others. While
potentially disastrous for the environment of the Arctic, the warming of the Arctic climate and
the reduction of sea ice has led to a diversification of the activities which occur within the Arctic
Circle. The broad diversification of Arctic activities has been driven by the expectations of the
populations within the states of the region as they possess the strongest preconceived ideas about
the Arctic. Therefore, it is important to confine a contextualization of Arctic activity to states
within the region and in possession of a coastline on the Arctic Ocean as those states possess the
strongest ideas about the Arctic in crucial areas ranging from climate research to reindeer
farming.13 Thus, it is important to contextualize the Arctic within the following key areas of
Arctic activity which have remained prevalent for states and impacted their populaces throughout
the 20th century; the geographical limitations for trade, the Arctic as a scientific zone of
10

Mary W. Shelley, Frankenstein, or the Modern Prometheus (Oxford University Press, 1998).
M. Ross, Polar Pioneers: John Ross and James Clark Ross
(McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP, 1994).
12
O. R. Young, "Whither the Arctic? Conflict or Cooperation in the Circumpolar North," Polar Record 45, no. 232
(2009). 73
13
Birger Poppel, "Interdependence of Subsistence and Market Economies in the Arctic
" The Economy of the North, Statistics Norway (2006).; L. C. Jensen and P. W. Skedsmo, "Approaching the North:
Norwegian and Russian Foreign Policy Discourses on the European Arctic," Polar Research 29, no. 3 (2010). 439
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research, the economic capacity of the Arctic region, and finally the strategic aspects of the
region.

Geographic Limitations on Trade

Figure 2: Arctic Trade Routes

The Arctic has always remained a difficult to traverse region even in the height of
summer when sea ice is at its lowest in the year. The polar ice cap has prevented the Arctic
Ocean from being utilized in any purposes other than for forces capable of flying above the
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ground or below the ice for year-round transit. 14 Yet, the Arctic has a strong history of being
viewed as a potential trade route for significant amounts of global trade with the greatest
impediment being the sea ice present in the region’s waterways. 15 The restrictions to travel
created by sea ice have been ever present within the Arctic region and directly impacted how the
region has been thought of throughout the globe and can be viewed as the single biggest
impediment to Arctic. With this in mind, it is crucial to understand how the Arctic has been
contextualized as a geographically limited region due to the unique constraints of Arctic
ecosystem on travel. In fact, these impediments to travel permeate the whole of the Arctic space
and are crucial to understanding how, why, and when new opinions on the Arctic develop.
Therefore, it is critical to examine the role sea ice has played in limiting travel and trade in the
Arctic over time by first detailing the how traditional sea travel was blocked by ice before
exploring how the 20th century has transformed Arctic transit.
From a historical perspective, the Arctic never really had a large scale of activity within
its seas because of the geographic limitations imposed by sea ice and the incapability of
seafaring technology. Initially, Travel in and around the Arctic Ocean was limited to the summer
months for seagoing vessels and even then the perils of navigating the shifting ice still
persisted.16 Trade Routes, such as the Northwest and Northeast Passages, persisted as powerful
motivating tool for the European powers to continue to probe the northern edges of North
America to find a potential outlet into the Pacific Ocean and onto East Asia lasting well into
modern times, unfortunately the discovery of such a route to pass through the ice proved

14

J. Dittmer et al., "Have You Heard the One About the Disappearing Ice? Recasting Arctic Geopolitics," Political
Geography 30, no. 4 (2011). 201
15
Ross, Polar Pioneers: John Ross and James Clark Ross
16
S. G. Borgerson, "Arctic Meltdown - the Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming," Foreign
Affairs 87, no. 2 (2008).63
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continually elusive.17 The dangers of Arctic waters became common knowledge readily quickly
and several expeditions from the British government alone turned back well before the sea had
become too treacherous or the ships had become locked in ice due simply to the fear of
becoming locked in ice.18 These fears persisted throughout nearly all of the explorations into the
Arctic which were continually funded by the governments of Denmark, Great Britain, Norway,
Russia, the United States, and the Netherlands dating back to the 1400’s.19 Each of these
expeditions brought back tales of ice sheets capable of sinking ships and fantastic landscapes
caked in snow even in the middle of the summer months, establishing the Arctic as an
inhospitable, desolate, and most importantly impossible place for any sailor. It is vital to note
that here is where the limitations of the technological developments of the expeditions to explore
the Arctic become shockingly clear. The oceangoing vessels utilized by sailors prior to the
invention of the steam-powered icebreaker were ice strengthened wooden vessels which posed
the danger of being too large to navigate through ice fields reliably, either ending up crushed by
ice or damaged beyond repair within the region.20 It was only following the development of
modern icebreakers in the Gulf of Finland by the mid-1800s that a reliable, blue-water capable,
large vessel would be able to successfully navigate ice fields, yet even then these icebreakers
were only useful up to a certain thickness of ice which varied with each vessel.21 This is
significant because though several of the historic expeditions returned with maps of the islands
and coastlines of the Arctic; however, the ever-shifting nature of sea ice made such maps
severely limited the usefulness of such maps as ice sheets ebb and flow with the tides.22 Thus,
17

Ibid. 70
J. Douglas Hoare, Arctic Exploration (Methuen & Company, 1906). 131
19
Ibid. 224
20
Deinder S. Sodhi, "Northern Sea Route Reconnaissance Study: A Summary of Icebreaking Technology," (1995).
1
21
Ibid. 1
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Borgerson, "Arctic Meltdown - the Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming."
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sea ice remained an ever present issue for the traversing of the Arctic which only truly began to
become mitigated with the invention of robust icebreakers in the mid-19th century.
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Figure 3: Vessels Traversing through Arctic

Fortunately, the 20th century experienced some significant thaw in regards to a more
traversable and tradable Arctic due to both technological innovation and the warming of the
Arctic Ocean. Throughout much of the 20th century the old barriers to travel remained impeding
traffic through the Arctic Ocean; however, the development of new, more powerful icebreakers
alongside more modern ships enabled broader access across areas such as the northern coast of
Asia.23 It was now possible to have ships traverse the Arctic during certain periods of the year
with icebreaker escort, and due to the extent of their Arctic territories the Soviet Union would

23
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possess the largest fleet of icebreakers.24Thus, portions of the Arctic Ocean now became more
open to trade and activity, notably taking the form of military bases, ports supporting the
extraction of natural resources, and supporting Arctic communities. Moreover, as climate change
has gone on the geographic limitations posed by sea ice have become less robust impediments
than they were before. The strongest obstruction to Arctic transportation has been Arctic sea ice,
but warming Arctic temperatures has been reducing the extent and thickness of the ice by nine
percent annually over the past thirty years.25 Thus, climate change has made the Arctic
increasingly more traversable to ocean going traffic, making it easier to maneuver material via
ship to various Arctic ports previously only open in the summer months and reduced the danger
of sea ice to travel year-round. The new accessibility of the Arctic has prompted a new line of
thinking from within the states with Arctic territories and states outside of the region as a new
frontier for investment has become available. For a ready example of the ease of Arctic travel
one can look at the Bahaman flagged Crystal Serenity which traversed the long sought Northwest
Passage through the Canadian Arctic in the summer of 2017 while carrying 1400 passengers.26
And that cruise company is not alone. However, in the midst of the latest opening up of new sea
routes and the reduction of sea ice is seeing a dramatic effect on Arctic and non-Arctic states
alike. The reduction of geographic limitations on the Arctic in terms of sea-ice melt has sparked
various efforts from Arctic states to prepare for future access in the region as the planet warms.
Policies have been adapted or crafted to prepare Arctic states for new traffic in Arctic regions,
ranging from the refurbishment and deepening of port facilities in the United States, Canada, and
Russia to the development of new ice-capable Naval vessels in Denmark, Canada, and the United
24

Ibid.
Josefino C. Comiso, "A Rapidly Declining Perennial Sea Ice Cover in the Arctic," Geophysical Research Letters
29, no. 20 (2002). 1
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States.27 Additionally, non-Arctic states have increasingly become active in examining Arctic
politics with states like Singapore, China, India, and a slew of European states joining the Arctic
Council as observer states, made significant investments into Arctic infrastructure, or are
otherwise preparing for changes in the characteristics of the Arctic region which may make trade
increasingly probable.28
The Arctic’s unique environment played a prominent role in ensuring that few
oceangoing vessels were able to cross its waters and actively engage the region. Yet as time as
gone on the historical limitations on Arctic travel have faded with the emergence of a new Arctic
tamed in part by technology and rising temperatures. The new, emerging Arctic is one which is
more accessible, rapidly changing, and garnering more interest for the potential it has been
believed to have for hundreds of years as a trade route.29 Therefore, though the Arctic has been a
realm with geographic limitations climate change has transformed the Arctic Ocean from an icelocked sea into a new highway for travel and trade.
A Scientific Region
Institutions like the Norwegian Polar Institute were founded early on in the 20th century
to study the region’s unique environment, climate, and the role it plays in the world system, and
were joined later by a myriad of organizations focused on scientific endeavors in the region.30 As
time has gone on, those various public and private supported research groups have been the
groups to identify the rapidness of sea ice retreat and distribute such knowledge to the global
populace.31 As these reports have disseminated, more organizations, states, and institutions have
27

Robert Neil Huebert; Heather Exner-Pirot; Adam Lajeunesse; Jay Gulledge, "Climate Change and International
Security: The Arctic as a Bellweather," (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2012). 3
28
Ibid. 21
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Dittmer et al., "Have You Heard the One About the Disappearing Ice? Recasting Arctic Geopolitics." 201
30
Harald D. Jolle, "The History of the Norwegian Polar Institute."
31
Robert Corell, "Arctic Climate Impact Accessment," Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 86, no. 6
(2005).
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become interested in studying the Arctic for a variety of reasons. Even now the international
community has continually updated and shared reports, with coordination from a variety of state
researchers, scientists, and climatologists discussing the Arctic in a variety of forums. Thus, in
order to grasp how the Arctic has been thought of in terms as a scientific region it is important to
breakdown into two prominent pushes from the scientific community; the study of the global
climate and the study of the arctic environment.
Initially, the Arctic has been a hotbed for climatologists studying the global climate
through the research carried out in the Arctic region, both in present climate research and historic
global climate. The Arctic may not seem to be the location to study current effects of items like
climate change or even ongoing weather systems, yet the region has been host to weather
installations and research stations since the early 20th century.32 It was believed during the 1930s
and 1940s that the weather currently experienced in the Arctic would eventually hit or effect
population centers in Europe, prompting the Germany army in the Second World War to
establish weather monitoring stations in Greenland and the Svalbard Islands.33 Additionally, the
polar location of the region coupled with its environmental fragility makes it into an ideal region
to study climate change. Essentially, the climate and environment of the Arctic region is
sensitive to changes in the overall global climate and shifts in the climate, such as increased
global temperatures of CFC pollution in the atmosphere can have a profound effect on overall
global climates.34 This atmospheric sensitivity of the Arctic region was first readily noticed in
the Antarctic region with the hole in the Ozone layer and saw the first real international
32

Daniel Heidt, "Clenched in the Jaws of America? Canadian Sovereignty and the Joint Arctic Weather Stations,
1946-1972," in Calgary Papers in Military and Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper No. 4: Canadian Arctic
Sovereignty and Security: Historical Perpsectives ed. P. Whitney Lackenbauer (University of Calgary 2011). 148
33
Frode Skarstein, "A Cursed Affair-How a Norwegian Expedition to Greenland Became the Usa's First Maritime
Capture in World War Ii," Polar Research 26, no. 2 (2007). William Barr, "Wettertrupp Haudegen: The Last
German Arctic Weather Station of World War Ii. Part I," Polar Record 23, no. 143 (1986). 143
34
Annika E. Nilsson, A Changing Arctic Climate: Science and Policy in the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment
(Linkoping, Sweden: Linkoping University, 2007).
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agreement related to climate change with the establishment of the Montreal Protocol in 1989,
which would then re-establish the Polar regions as an important area for the study of the global
climate and lead eventually to the founding of the Arctic Council. Moreover, the Arctic region
has also played a critical role in studying the historic global climate. few regions possess long
lasting bodies of ice which trap sediment in their layers that remain credible to study historic
climates, among the most popular regions for these coring expeditions is the Arctic region for the
age of the glaciers in places like Greenland or Norway and the relative ease of access to the
region.35 The expeditions, research stations, and international cooperation on the study of the
historic climate has provided a host of climate data which relates not just to the history of the
climate of the Arctic region but has provided a window in time to a rough picture of the total
global climate stretching back hundreds of thousands of years ago.36 Thus, the arctic region
today represents a critical zone to study the global climate and provide insight into how humans
have affected the global climate. Today, the Arctic retains its importance to modern meteorology
and climate studies with the most interesting recent developments have been the emerging study
of permafrost locked methane gas and the role the Polar Regions play in reflecting solar radiation
back into space.37
As climate scientists and meteorologists study the Arctic region to enhance human
understanding of the historic climate and the effects humans have had on the climate over time, a
host of environmentalists, conservationists, and biologists have made their mark as well. The
Arctic features a unique and fragile environment as previously mentioned, and the best way to
examine how this has factored into the scientific perception of the region is to detail the
conservation of the unique ecosystem and the severe concern for pollution in the region. Initially,
35

Ibid.
Ibid.
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in recent years the conservation of the Arctic ecosystem has become increasingly salient in the
international community. The best indicator for such efforts is of course the humble polar bear,
one of the largest and most visible creatures affected by the retreat of the ice sheets.
Conservation efforts for the polar bear emerged in relation to their loss of habitat due directly to
climate change.38 A variety of international institutions like the World Wildlife Fund latched
onto the polar bear as the most visibly impacted Arctic animal in the hopes of increasing public
support for their conservation efforts and to a large degree it has proven successful with the
governments of Canada, the United States, Denmark, Norway, and the Soviet Union signing onto
the International Polar Bear Agreement in 1973.39 The status of the polar bear is one which is
continually looked to as the poster child of the status of the Arctic environment, but the region as
a whole experiences a host of support for the study of the changes within the environment and
those animals residing in its unique ecosystem. While Arctic animals reliant on sea ice are
getting attention, the various commonly fished fish species call the Arctic home from Pollock to
cod, and a host of international agreements, treaties, and organizations exist to help manage
those fish populations to prevent overfishing in the region.40 For instance, the status of fisheries
has often factored into Norwegian-Russian relations in regards to the Barents Sea and the
Svalbard Islands deep within the Arctic Ocean, in addition to contributing in part to historical
animosity between various Arctic states.41 Thus, the establishment of new programs, treaties, and
agreements to manage the Arctic population of fishes is not out of the ordinary and often
discussed feature of politics at the top of the world, with the most recent being the Agreement to
38
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39
Pal Prestrud and Ian Stirling, "The International Polar Bear Agreement and the Current Status of Polar Bear
Conservation," Aquatic Mammals 20, no. 3 (1994). 113
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Prevent Unregulated Commercial Fishing on the High Seas of the Central Arctic Ocean in
October of 2018.42
An important offshoot of the environmentalism and conservation previously discussed,
preventing and responding to pollution has been increasingly important to Arctic states as time
has gone on especially in hydrocarbon pollution and communal response goals. The most
damaging type of pollution which can be experienced in a clime like the Arctic is that of an oil
spill. Increased activity in the Arctic Ocean and the discussions of placing oil platforms,
increasing shipping, and the shipping of oil via ship has brought up fears of the Exxon-Valdez
Oil Spill to the front of several environmental discussions.43 Essentially, no Arctic state wishes
to see the fragile environment brought closer to the brink by something akin to an oil spill and
has been actively working towards preventing such spills through regulation whenever possible
in order to avoid the financial and political costs of addressing oil spills in the frigid region.44
The communal push towards the regulation of oil extraction and other sources of potential
hydrocarbon pollution has in turn empowered a communal response to such disasters in the
region. Essentially, the public consciousness in regarding the Arctic is mostly determined to
ensure the region remains as unspoiled as possible to help preserve the already threatened
ecosystem.45 Popular protests, non-governmental campaigns, and lobbying efforts related to oil
extraction in the region are not uncommon in the domestic politics for members of the Arctic
council, and often enjoy some success. Take for instance the efforts of a variety of organizations
during the Obama Administration in the United States to prevent oil extraction in the Arctic
Ocean and the subsequent executive order to ban oil exploration in the Arctic Ocean North of
42
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Alaska.46 The most visible demonstration of popular dissatisfaction regarding Arctic oil drilling
which led to an international incident involved Greenpeace’s protests over Russian Oil Platforms
in the Arctic Ocean which impacted relations between Russia and the United States47. Even
today, the popular inclination to disapprove of Arctic oil exploration and extraction coupled with
the costs of operating within the region have dissuaded several oil companies from engaging in
the region or reduce their footprint within it.48 Thus, the communal push towards hydrocarbon
extraction in the Arctic has become a salient political issue for some Arctic Council members at
best and at worst has become visible and disapproved of by the broader international community.
The Arctic region has always engaged the minds of scientists to study its unique insights
into our planet’s climate and the inhabitants. Overtime the visibility in terms of a realm of
scientific study, information, and conservation has emerged, especially in the years since 1989’s
Montreal Protocol and the crisis of the hole in the Ozone above Antarctica. Climate change has
only served to make such scientific issues more prominent for the region and much more salient
within the Arctic states.

46

Darryl Fears and Juliet Eilperin, "President Obama Bans Oil Drilling in Large Areas of Atlantic and Arctic
Oceans," The Washington Post 2016.
47
Pavel K. Baev, "Russia's Arctic Ambitions and Anxieties," Current History 112, no. 756 (2013).
48
Erin McGroarty, "Protestors Take over Anwr Environmental Scoping Meeting," Fairbanks Daily News-Miner,
February 5, 2019 2019.

17
Economic Capacity
Arctic Economic Overview

Estimated Regional Oil
Reserves
Savings on Shipping Costs for
Bulk Carrier Transportation
Distance Saved in Travel
from Europe to Asia

89,983.21 Million Barrels49
$80,00050
5,000 Miles (Two Weeks travel
compared to other routes)51

Table 1: Arctic Economic Overview

Historically the arctic has been a region without a great deal of economic activity of any
significance, due to inaccessibility and high costs to operate in the region. In spite of these
limitations, there have been a few prominent industries above the Arctic Circle ranging from the
extraction of natural resources to the previously mentioned fisheries.52 Ultimately, none of these
industries save for the oil, gold and fishing industries have yielded significant returns for states
and even those industries are much more expensive in the climes of the Arctic. As the sea ice
recedes and the region warms, the Arctic is increasingly being declared to be “open for business”
in every state bordering it. Speculative exploration for oil has occurred off the coasts of Canada,
Russia, Greenland, Norway, and Alaska.53 Additionally, the potential trade routes of the region
have drawn a myriad of investors and attention from all over the globe, with thousands of
nautical miles, man hours, resources, money, and time saved compared to other trade routes if
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the Arctic can be suitable for shipping in the future.54 This trade route speculation has firmly
taken hold on states and corporations, for instance Chinese Premier Xi Jinping declaring a goal
for a Polar Silk Road to connect the European and Chinese markets by utilizing the Russian
Northern Route through the Arctic.55 Essentially, the economic aspects of the Arctic region have
several states chomping at the bit to exploit the new opportunities within the region. To better
understand this relatively new phenomenon for the region, it is important to once again visit the
status of hydrocarbon extraction in the region and the role climate change is playing regarding
Arctic economic activity.
First, the Arctic has a great deal to offer state economies in terms of hydrocarbon
extraction which is most readily understood through the examination of the Arctic’s history
regarding oil and the role large corporations have played in the region. Historically, the Arctic
has played an important role in pushing the Arctic region into the economic spotlight. Following
the 2nd World War, a series of oil exploration efforts underwent across the globe to determine
where the global reserves of oil were located and the Arctic was predicted to hold a great deal of
the globe’s untapped oil reserves.56 This prediction prompted a series of expeditions into the
region to determine exactly where these deposits of oil were to be found and how accessible they
were for extraction.57 Ultimately, the predicted reserves have encouraged several oil companies
from throughout the globe to pursue oil located within the Arctic region or nearby it, with the
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most readily accessible areas of oil having been tapped by Russia.58 The harshness of the region
though has led to a major concern for oil population for each state within the Arctic region due to
the oil pipelines used for transport. The Arctic climate has continually been a thorn in the side for
the companies seeking to extract Arctic oil as the extreme weather conditions makes maintaining
any kind of infrastructure expensive and sea routes all but impossible for transporting oil. The
persistence of this problem has led to some innovation regarding oil extraction technologies, yet
there still remain the question of accessibility.59 Nearly all of this innovation for Arctic oil
operations has been pursued by oil companies and increasingly funding has been going towards
more advanced forms of oil extraction. Essentially, the Arctic region has been viewed by oil
companies as a massive opportunity for investment because of its relative untapped potential
compared to other global regions.60 The state with the most action regarding Arctic oil extraction
is Russia due to the relative accessibility of the reserves of oil off its coast in the Arctic Ocean
and Barents Sea, and the relationship it has with its major state-owned oil companies.61 Russian
oil companies like Gazprom have continually viewed the Arctic as the means to continue their
levels of oil extraction and have used the amount of predicted oil reserves to garner investment
from throughout the world into Russian Arctic territories to extract and explore for oil.62 Thus it
is apparent that oil is important for the Arctic economy and a major driver because of the
importance of hydrocarbons for the global economy.
The effects of climate change become more apparent in the Arctic region yearly, and due
to those changes the economy of the Arctic Ocean has been looked towards for a major
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resurgence. Essentially, climate change is viewed as a major opportunity for the states with
Arctic territory because of how sea ice retreat transforms oil transportation and relatively lessens
technological reliance for economic activity. Initially, the largest change for the Arctic region’s
economy because of the effects of climate change is the transformation of hydrocarbon
transportation. As previously mentioned the Arctic utilizes pipelines to transport hydrocarbons
across vast swathes of territory, which is not the most cost efficient means of transporting oil.63
Throughout the world it is usually much easier to transport oil and other goods via waterways,
and climate change is making this a reality for the Arctic. As sea ice retreats it will be possible to
construct oil terminals for tanker ships making it safer, easier, and more efficient to transport oil
and other petroleum products.64 Moreover, it is easier to refurbish ports in the region than to
construct whole new pipelines stretching from Siberia to the Russian heartland, coming with the
added benefit of being capable to berth vessels capable of transporting other good to and from
the region as well.65 Another boon to the Arctic economy is as climate change affects the region,
it will become slightly less technologically intensive to operate within the region. In the first
subsection of this chapter, there was a broad discussion on transportation in the Arctic and the
role icebreakers played in making the region more accessible. This is a major benefit and
indicative of the overall condition of the region, right now it is costly to operate any kind of
facilities in the Arctic for economic gain. Transportation of goods in the Arctic is expensive due
to the cost of infrastructure maintenance within the region, the region’s geographic location away
from main economic sectors, and the reduction of traditional regional transportation such as ice-
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roads.66 The versatility of port facilities in light of opening waterways varies from state to state
in the Arctic region, but given the impact of climate change on other modes of transportation
within the region the opening of maritime routes represents an opportunity for transportation
improvements.67 Bettering transportation to the region through the opening of waterways could
prove critical in developing economic activity in the region and more efficiently connect the
region to the global economy.
The economic realities of a new Arctic birthed by climate change are still unknown,
though there are some promising forecasts from a variety of states, corporations, and
municipalities within the region. The Arctic has had a historic role in providing energy to the
global economy and it is very likely that role will only become more prominent as the ice once
choking the Arctic Ocean abates.
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Strategic Purpose

Figure 4: Arctic Territorial Disputes

From a military perspective, the Arctic has featured prominently in the minds of
politicians and military leaders for hundreds of years. As previously discussed the initial
concerns of these individuals was in the Arctic as a region for trade and even then those
inclinations varied from state to state. However, the strategic location of the Arctic as the
shortest route between North America, Europe, and Asia has historically attracted a great deal of
military interest, notably in during the Cold War.68 As climate change lessens the frigid grip of
sea-ice on Arctic waterways, the military dimensions of the Arctic are bound to continually
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resurface in domestic and international discourses of Arctic states; therefore it is important to
contextualize the region as a strategic zone for military activity by examining traditional Arctic
military operations and emerging Arctic military developments.
Traditionally, the Arctic has generally had a pacifying effect on the states interacting
between it due to how difficult it was to operate within the region and it status as an area for
nuclear deterrence. First, the sea ice which has been previously mentioned as a major block in
transit within the Arctic has also impeded military operations by nearly all of the Arctic states in
the region. As an impediment the sea ice and temperatures of the region has proven problematic
in encouraging territorial disputes, yet also beneficial in inhibiting the escalation of territorial
disputes into conflicts.69 Moreover, operations within the region necessitate a higher level of
training to operate within its seas and shores then other regions of the world with little cross
application other than the Antarctic.70 Thus, the presence of military forces in the region was
determined by global issues causing the Arctic to be populated by token forces, military
observers, and troops designated for operations elsewhere in the world in regions less restricted
by environmental factors like sea-ice.71 Therefore the fungibility of capability in the region has
led to a relatively pacific region in terms of generalized military activity, yet it is important to
note the Arctic has played a significant role in the nuclear deterrence of the Cold War.72 The only
way to maneuver through the Arctic region without impediments has continually been the usage
of submarines, and following the implementation of mutually assured destruction policies for
both the Soviet Union and the United States the Arctic gained new significance as a base for
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ballistic missile submarines.73 Following the Cold War, the Arctic has played a role in nuclear
weapons as well through missile defense systems.74 Beyond these factors, a majority of the
military involvement in the Arctic has traditionally been related to coast guard activities and
intermittent training operations.
As climate change has affected the Arctic so too has it affected the military dimensions of
the region. Climate change has served to reignite the passions of Arctic populations and also
remedied the issue of white-water navies. Initially, as the Arctic has warmed it has increased the
visibility of the region in the minds of politicians, military leaders, and citizens throughout the
Arctic states.75 Take for instance the Harper administration of Canada, Harper made his run for
premiership on the basis of reasserting Canadian authority in the Arctic and maintained
leadership for nine years.76 The political saliency of the Arctic exists throughout the region as
well, though its traction in the political sphere varies from state to state CITATION. Moreover,
even in states where the Arctic remains on the relative fringes of the political discussions within
capitals the transformation of the region and its resulting impact on the global economy has
warranted a response from military planners, for instance in the US quickly shelved a plan for
constructing a new icebreaker when the political debate moved elsewhere but the US military
released several documents expressing the importance of the region to future US policy in the
form of the US Navy’s Arctic Road Map.77 Furthermore, various governmental agencies across
the Arctic region have sought to improve their military capabilities within the region, ranging
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from the refurbishment of existing port facilities, the purchasing of new Cold-Weather
equipment, and the training of troops in extreme weather conditions.78 In the midst of all of this
though, most prominently is the discussion of naval operations within the region. As previously
noted, the Arctic has hosted and continues to host naval forces from the nations inhabiting it;
however, it is important to distinguish between the white-water forces and blue water forces of
the region. An overwhelming majority of the fleets of the Arctic states are blue-water forces, yet
it is important to note that as climate change reduces the thickness and extent of Arctic ice sheets
more blue-water forces are building ice-capable ships for Arctic patrol.79 Fundamentally, the
retreat of sea-ice is encouraging militarization of the region through the construction of new
patrol vessels, the refurbishment of ports for military usage, and new training operations for
forces expected to operate regionally.80 As the Arctic continues to warm the region will become
more accommodating to regular blue-water navies, thereby becoming increasingly more able to
be militarized as states will not require specific technologies for their forces like icebreakers to
operate within the region.
While most of this militarization can be pointed towards to be the simple development of
capabilities to adjust to changes in the region, it is still a militarization of the region which
historically has had severe limitations to travel and military activity. The major response of the
Arctic states has been to, as a community; ignore the transforming military dimensions which are
emerging to the Arctic region within international institutions.
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CHAPTER 3
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Already there exists a host of literature related to the study of the Arctic, the Arctic
Council, and national identity. Importantly though, there is not piece in the body of literature I
have found which directly relates to the study of the overall effectiveness of the Arctic Council
in fostering change within its member states over the course of its entire existence. Thus, it is
important to briefly examine a small sample of relevant literature to this research before moving
on. The literature currently in existence on the Arctic Council and the Arctic is best broken into
NINE differing sections related to the following concepts; critical concepts for analysis, the
Arctic Council, Arctic economics, national identity in political discourse, polar security,
cooperation in the Arctic, Canada in the Arctic, and Russia in the Arctic.
Critical Concepts of Analysis
Initially, the most important pieces of the puzzle for examining the intersection of
national identity, national interests, and the Arctic Council is the theoretical framework utilized
within this research. To fit this end the critical frameworks utilized for this research is tripartite
in its focus and including the following critical concepts; Mackinder’s geopolitics, Copeland’s
trade security spiral, and Hopf’s logic of habit.
First, in terms of developing critical areas of importance for the study of the Arctic
region, it is critically important to begin with a brief examination of Hartford Mackinder’s
Democratic Ideals and Reality. Mackinder argues in this piece that the endowments of a state in
terms of resources available are important, and in fact vital for the development of power for
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states.81 Moreover, the geographic location of those states and the geography between the state
and where their interests lie is vitally important in terms of approaching broader issues of
international relations.82 Though Mackinder only truly mentions the Arctic in passing as an
impediment to circumnavigation of Eurasia, the geopolitics Mackinder lays out in this piece are
critical to examining how the scope and scale of the Arctic’s transformation are so significant for
the global community.
Next, for Copeland, one of the most important features of the international system is how
each state relates to the other in terms of trade and economics. Copeland argues each state will
seek to protect its own economic interests and to maintain monopolies on its trade routes
whenever possible.83 Copeland proposes the encroachment upon or destruction of the
monopolies states possess on markets propagates wars between the states encroaching upon and
the states controlling those markets.84 Given the expressed importance of the Arctic as a
commercial region for the states on its borders, Copeland’s piece is significant as it directly
examines how states seek to protect and exploit markets they perceive they have a unique claim
upon.
Finally, in Hopf’s view international relations can be broken down into a series of
fundamental engagements between states which then set the tone for the overall interactions
between those states.85 Essentially, Hopf argues there are logics of habit which persists within
the international community, particularly in the foreign policies of states in interacting on nearly
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every issue and event.86 Hopf argues these logics create lenses by which states view the world
and color their opinions of the actions of other states in certain situations.87 Though Hopf argues
these habits can be mutable, they are only mutable with great difficulty because to create a logic
of habit within the international system takes time and effort.88 Hopf’s piece is important as it
provides a means to examine how Arctic politics may change as the logics which have led to
modern Arctic politics are transformed by climate change.
In terms of conjunction, the combination of Mackinder’s concept of the world island and
Copeland’s insistence on the importance of trade route security offers an interesting framework
for analyzing the interactions of Arctic militarization on interstate relations within the region.
Meanwhile, the logic of habit offers interesting insights related to how the Arctic states, notably
the coastal Arctic states, will interact as the region becomes increasingly viable for trade and
travel. Thus, it is critical to not just include these pieces in this body of research but to combine
them to develop a better idea of the progression of Arctic politics over the past thirty years.
The Arctic Council
It is impossible to have a discussion related to the ability of the Arctic Council to affect
its members without including the body of literature currently regarding the Arctic Council. To
this end it is important to examine how the region was initially constructed and how the unique
problems of the Arctic are posing a challenge to the Council.
Initially, Young provides a wonderful examination of the Arctic Council, the
fundamental structures of its cooperative frameworks, and the problems it faces within the
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region.89 Young details emerging problems such as the issue of developing legally binding
regimes for the region and the question of a potential Arctic Treaty in line with the Antarctic
Treaty.90 Young concludes with an overview of the place of the Arctic Council in Arctic politics,
proposing the Council should only focus on issues where it has a distinct advantage compared to
other organizations and can therefore excel.91 Kesktialo builds off of Young’s ideas regarding the
Arctic Council through her study of how the Arctic has been constructed as a region both
through the various projects of its international institutions and the preexisting region-building
literature.92 Arguing the Arctic is a constructed region built by the interests of its principle actors
within the Arctic Council and their according interests, stemming from historic interactions
within the region.93 To this end, Kesktialo comparatively examines Nordic and North American
views, concluding North American views have been the dominant discourse for the Arctic in its
construction as a regime.94 It is critical to include both of these pieces within this research
because of their ability to provide unique perspectives on the Arctic Council’s construction and
ability to create an international region of the Arctic.
Second, it is important to detail how the Council has reacted and responded to the
ongoing challenges of interacting at the top of the world. Young examines the impact ongoing
environmental changes have had on Arctic governance, cooperation, and the Arctic Council.95
Young considers a variety differing solutions proposed to moderate the changing physical and
political environment at the top of the world, arguing a tripartite solution to the problems of the
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Arctic is required.96 In Young’s view this tripartite solution relies on agreements regarding
territorial disputes, a push to construct issue-tailored governmental regimes, and an expansion of
the character of the Arctic Council to meet these emerging issues.97 Byers builds off of Young’s
concerns regarding the Arctic Council’s ability to respond to emerging issues in terms of
encroachment of other international politics into the Arctic region’s relationship by examining
the impacts of the Ukrainian Crisis on the ability of the Arctic states to effectively cooperate
within Arctic international relations.98 Byers frames his study of the status of Arctic politics
before and after the Crimean crisis through the lens of Keohane and Nye’s image of complex
interdependence.99 Ultimately, Byers discovers the Ukrainian Crisis has caused a suspension of a
variety of military and economic cooperative programs, the programs most closely related to the
Arctic in environmental, research sharing, and search and rescue operations remain resolute
because of the complexities of the interdependence Russia has on the international organizations
tailored to the region.100 Each of these pieces are important to include within my own research
because of their ability to elucidate the capacity and capability of the Arctic Council to both
weather and respond to Crises within and without the Arctic.
Coupled together, each of these four pieces patches together paints a picture of the Arctic
Council’s history of being shaped by the interests of its members and the broader interactions
between the sub-blocs within it. Therefore, it provides an important angle to examine how the
goals and objectives of the Council can ultimately be shaped by members and how each member
responds to crises within the Arctic Community.
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Arctic Economics
Given the economic weight lent to the Arctic by the international community, it is vital to
briefly review the importance levied towards Arctic economics by the scholarly community. This
section is most efficiently divided into sections regarding how the Arctic community has reacted
regarding Arctic economics and the domestic considerations of Arctic states regarding Arctic
economics.
First, Keil notes the various aspects of significant schools of international relations,
neorealist and neoliberal institutionalism, thinking in regards to institutionalist explanations of
the Arctic region’s cooperation on a variety of issues with a particular focus on economics.101
Keil argues the debate between these two schools concerning the Arctic’s resource reserves has
failed to adequately examine the varying motivations for Arctic states concerning Arctic
resources, particularly oil and natural gas.102 In researching the interests of those Arctic states,
Keil discovers a varying degree of interest related to those natural resources though there is
nothing consistent or conclusive into the likelihood of confrontation among the Arctic states
because a rush for Arctic rush is unlikely.103 Building off of this idea of a rush for Arctic
resources being unlikely, Jensen and Skedsmo detail the various foreign policy discourses
describing the relationship Russia and Norway have to the Arctic, particularly related to official
communications to other states.104 To accomplish this Jensen and Skedsmo examine a host of
official communications from both governments related to the Arctic, discovering the Norwegian
approach is characterized by a discursive mobilization on Arctic issues while Russian approaches
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are broadly characterized by assertiveness and relative gains problems.105 Jensen and Skedsmo
argue such a difference is related to the relative resource endowments within the European Arctic
and how those resources factor into the national interests of the state.106 With both of these
pieces in mind, it is clear there are competing narratives regarding the Arctic’s resource
endowments and their impact on the politics of the region.
Along this line, Overland examines the domestic economic potential for the Russian
Arctic. Overland asserts the view of Russian action in the Arctic as overly nationalistic and
concerning is unfounded, instead she proposes Russian policy actions are completely in line with
the broader region and the actions of other states.107 Notably, Overland concludes the broader
economic considerations of the Arctic region are causing some measure of cooperation among
the various states as international corporations maneuver throughout the region.108 Vladimirova
builds off of these ideas related to broader spectrum cooperation among Arctic states in detailing
the Russian approaches and beliefs related to sustainable economic development in the European
Arctic.109 Vladimirova reveals the political discourse on sustainable, green development is
different depending on with whom politicians are interacting.110 Within the international system
Russian politicians are willing to support communal objectives related to green development and
environmentalism, yet at home those same politicians are far more concerned with high rates of
poverty and unemployment.111 Thus, domestically Russia is much more concerned with
extracting resources in order to feed the needs of the economy and the people, rather than
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preserving or managing those resources for future usage.112 Each of these pieces argues there is
an almost paradoxical approach to economic development within the Arctic which almost pays
lip service to the will of the international community.
Taken as a whole there is an interesting assertiveness related to the economic
developments of the Arctic region. There is simultaneously not great rush for Arctic natural
resources, yet there remains a significant amount of domestic interest in those resources in order
to fuel the growth of national power. Thus, the Arctic is a realm of both intense economic focus
from the international and domestic communities of Arctic states but there is no real way to
significantly enrich Arctic investors.
Arctic Identity
An urgently important facet of studying the intersection of Arctic identity, national
interests, and the Arctic Council is the concept of Arctic identity as it exists within the Arctic
states as they currently lie. Therefore it is important to detail how identity affects regime
adherence, then the conceptualization of the Arctic within state bureaucracies, before finally
detailing how the Arctic space is carved out in national discourse.
First, Medby reviews the likelihood of regime adherence of Arctic states to the regimes
created by the Arctic Council and the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Seas,
utilizing Norway as a case study.113 Medby details the various pieces of Norwegian identity
which factor into developing proper adherence to the regimes proffered within the international
community and how those regimes in turn affect the identity of the state.114 Medby concludes the
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national identity of Norway plays a significant role in determining the regime adherence of the
Norwegian government. 115
In another piece, Medby examines how the arctic is conceptualized as a region in the
identity of various bureaucrats working for the governments of the eight states of the Arctic
Council.116 Medby’s discussion of the humanization of the Arctic by these bureaucrats offers an
interesting introspection into how discourses related to national identity shape the individuals
who assist in administering the state.117 This is critical because it offers insight into how the
bureaucrats feel they should act in regards to the Arctic, or what they feel they should represent
when administering the Arctic.118
Finally, Dittmer et al. detail how the space for Arctic geopolitics is carved out within the
areas both within and without the Arctic Circle.119 The focus on the local and every day of the
Arctic through the examination of the construction of Arctic geopolitics through the eyes of the
people most closely experiencing them is used to offer a critique to the prevailing neo-realist
identifications of emerging Arctic politics.120 Ultimately, the researchers conclude with a call to
action related to studying the construction of the Arctic both through the ethnography of the
region but also through its geographic construction as a near or far space related to scientific
study.121
Taken as a group, these pieces paint a picture of a national identity for Arctic states
rooted in key concepts which are uniquely Arctic and poignant for the population of these Arctic
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states. What’s more is those identities play a significant role in outlining how the state
government adheres to the tenants of institutional regimes and presents such information to the
rest of its population, thereby creating salient issues related to the protection or preservation of
the Arctic based on those same national identities. In this sense it is critical to include each of
these pieces in this research on the Arctic Council’s ability to affect state policies.
Polar Security
As the Arctic has warmed, an increasing number of newspaper outlets have become
concerned about the securitization of Arctic space by the states on the coast of the Arctic Ocean.
Thus, it is important to include the scholarly body’s contribution to the study of polar security in
the warming Arctic. The securitization of Arctic space is best considered in two parts; first the
relationship between Arctic security and climate change and second the Russian-Western
relationship in the Arctic.
First, it is important to understand the impacts of climate change on Arctic security.
Gerhard et al. focus their piece on studying the impact of climate change on the regional politics
of the Arctic related to the geographical spread of the Arctic region.122 The authors argue the
Arctic is experiencing a host of impacts from climate change which may prove exacerbating to
the ongoing regional tensions related to territorial disputes and intimacy.123 The authors conclude
though climate change possesses the potential to increase the likelihood of conflict in the region,
the various institutions within the region hold the potential to actually increase cooperation on
unique Arctic issues as the region’s climate warms.124 Building off of the ideas of changes within
the Arctic sphere, Blunden examines the ongoing security developments of the Arctic Council
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since the collapse of the Soviet Union.125 Blunden argues the ongoing ice-melt within the Arctic
poses the potential to transform ongoing Arctic relations from cooperation because of the amount
of economic stakes within the region.126 Ultimately, Blunden concludes the ongoing rhetorical
actions of the various Arctic states serves to distort the relatively stable region, with the only true
security risk being the potential the rhetorical vitriol among the Arctic states to increase feelings
of distrust among the Arctic states.127 Continuing the idea of economics being an Achilles heel to
future Arctic relationships, Dodds analyzes how Arctic Coastal states utilize the international
legal framework to reframe and justify their claims to exclusive economic zones in the midst of
the Arctic Ocean.128 Dodds recognizes and details the various irritations levied by various states
and indigenous peoples institutions who are dissatisfied with the overall treatment of the ongoing
Arctic territorial disputes.129 Dodds concludes there is a rising concern the coastal Arctic states
will seek to enhance their territorial claims as the overall region continues to warm and access
improves.130 Taken as a group, it is clear climate change is altering the formerly stable
relationships at the top of the world by increasing access to historical territorial disputes while
decreasing costs of access for the navies of the Arctic Ocean.
Second, the most important and ongoing facet of Arctic security relations is the historic
dyad between the West and Russia. Atland and Pedersen examine the history of Russian-Western
security policy interactions regarding the Norwegian Svalbard Archipelago.131 In order to
examine these interactions and changes within Russian security policy, Atland and Pedersen
125

Blunden, "The New Problem of Arctic Stability." 121
Ibid.122
127
Ibid. 137
128
Dodds, "Flag Planting and Finger Pointing: The Law of the Sea, the Arctic and the Political Geographies of the
Outer Continental Shelf."
129
Ibid.
130
Ibid.
131
Kristian Atland; Torbjorn Pedersen, "The Svalbard Archipelago in Russian Security Policy: Overcoming the
Legacy of Fear- or Reproducing It? ," European Secuirty 17 (2008). 227
126

37
utilize a securitization framework in order to determine which issues hold the largest degree of
importance to Russia.132 Ultimately, Atland and Pedersen reveal the great deal of concern the
Russian government holds for Norwegian policies on the Svalbard Archipelago, leaving the
Svalbard Islands a source of concern for Russian security policy.133 While Russia still has
ongoing security concerns in the Arctic as elucidated by Atland and Pedersen, in another article
Atland studies the Arctic interactions between the Russian military and the Russian oil industry
in order to examine Russian desecuritization in the European Arctic.134 Interestingly, Atland
unveils issues once solely pertinent to the Russian military are steadily becoming the realm of
civilian economic activity in order to support the ongoing expansion of Russian Arctic oil
extraction.135 Atland concludes this trend has been ongoing since the early 1990’s and will likely
continue as desecuritization does not impede larger Russian security goals.136 This duality of
Russian policies in the region is further explored by Baev. Baev reveals it is simultaneously a
zone for cooperation and an area of possible contention with the West following the 2014
Ukrainian Crisis.137 Baev argues the ongoing development of Russian military capabilities in the
Arctic and the development of new Arctic infrastructure are incoherent to broader Russian policy
related to the Arctic.138 Thus, Russia is left in a position of its military somewhat drawing down
its capabilities in order to satisfy cooperative goals from the Russian foreign ministry despite the
fact Russian military funding is what is financing the redevelopment of Soviet-Era settlements
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and installations across Russia’s northern coast.139 All of these pieces together paint a picture of
states seemingly confused as to how they would like to engage on another in such a strategically
important region of the world.
Both of the security relationships examined reveal an Arctic which is simultaneously
dynamic in its development and stalled in how it would like to proceed with its security
objectives. In a security sense, the melting of sea-ice has increased the visibility of emerging
security issues to national governments while the historic animosities of the region are both
reinforced by this and tempered by it.
Canada and the Arctic
Canada is never really considered by the average person to be a vital player in
international politics, but in the Arctic that is a different story. For Canada, the Arctic is a key
part of national identity, security policy, and economic future. Thus, it is important to examine
how Canada approaches the Arctic in terms of security, economics, and national policy.
First, Byers researches the military dimension of Canada in the Arctic, proposing climate
change has played a role in revolutionizing Arctic security and facilitating non-military
cooperation among the Arctic states.140 However, Byers is sure to note the dimension of ongoing
territorial disputes among the various Arctic states, particularly Canada.141 Yet, Byers remains
hopeful the Arctic will retain its cooperative norms in the face of ongoing climate change due to
the history among the Arctic states of cooperation on communal issues.142 Building off of the
concern for territorial disputes mentioned by Byers, Griffiths reveals the upswing of nationalistic
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sovereignty sentiment following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 related to the security of the
Northwest Passage.143 Griffiths seeks to dispel the myth that Canadian national sovereignty is at
risk in the Arctic due to the relatively slow decline of sea-ice and there is already a strong set of
regulations related to Canadian waterways.144 Griffiths concludes the “…futile handwringing…”
regarding the Northwest Passage is likely to continue, though he outlines several options for
strengthening Canadian claims to the Northwest Passage by bolstering the Canadian relationship
with the indigenous Inuit peoples.145 Both Byers and Griffiths reveal critical Canadian feelings
towards the Arctic and the importance attached to it.
Next, Ruel researches the interactions between national identity and the propensity to
pursue natural resources within the Arctic region for Canada.146 Ruel argues the melting of the
Arctic ice-cap is refocusing certain aspects of Canadian policy and identity towards the Arctic
region, and ignoring the various real costs associated with the development of the Canadian
Arctic.147 Ruel concludes the push to develop the Arctic region is one full of challenges and
poses the risk to destabilize some of the relationships Canada has built with the indigenous
peoples of the Canadian north.148 In this sense, Ruel paints a picture of Canada simultaneously
ignorant of and interested in creating economic opportunities for itself in the Arctic.149
In terms of national identity, Landriault investigates how Canadian public opinion on
Arctic issues and assesses the effect of government activism on those opinions.150 Landriault
examines polling over the course of the period from 2006-2015 related to circumpolar issues and
143

F. Griffiths, "The Shipping News - Canada's Arctic Sovereignty Not on Thinning Ice," ibid.58, no. 2 (2003). 257
Ibid. 264
145
Ibid. 282
146
G. K. Ruel, "The (Arctic) Show Must Go on Natural Resource Craze and National Identity in Arctic Politics,"
ibid.66, no. 4 (2011). 825
147
Ibid. 826
148
Ibid. 829
149
Ibid. 833
150
M. Landriault, "Public Opinion on Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security," Arctic 69, no. 2 (2016). 160
144

40
politics.151 Landriault concludes though Arctic issues do not overwhelm other significant issues
for Canadians, they routinely receive a high level of support related to foreign policy and
national defense.152 Landriault offers a caveat though in suggesting Canadian public opinion
favors approaches to Arctic sovereignty prioritizing negotiations and international institutions.153
Lackenbauer builds on the concept of prioritizing international institutions brought forth by
Landriault in examining how the Canadian policy of “One Arctic” situates Canadian domestic
policy in line with Canada’s chairmanship of the Arctic Council.154 Lackenbauer provides a
historical examination of Canadian policy related to sovereignty finishing out with a comparison
of the Trundeau administrations differences and similarities to the Harper administration related
to the Arctic.155 Lackenbauer concludes the Canadian policy introduction of “One Arctic” fit into
broader conceptions of the Arctic in a Canadian sense, and mark as another attempt to imprint a
Canadian view of the Arctic onto the rest of the Arctic Council.156 As a pair, these authors
research suggests while Canada is interested in pursuing institutional solutions to its problems,
there is still a strong spring of national identity which colors its perceptions and interactions with
those same institutions.
Ultimately, all of these pieces together show a mosaic of Canadian beliefs related to the
Arctic which are strongly held and in competition of Canadian policy goals. The propensity to
view the Arctic as a realm in need of securitization despite the lack of tangible threats to
Canadian national sovereignty is at odds with the desire to pursue institutional solutions to those
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same problems. In sum, Canadian policy on the Arctic is a mixed bag of national interests,
normal Canadian policy pursuits, and fears of a weakened Canada bullied by its neighbors.
Russia and the Arctic
Finally, for the proposes of examining how the national identities of Arctic states jive
with the general goals of the Arctic Council it is critical to examine the scholarly research on
Russia in the Arctic. As the largest Arctic state, both in terms of economic activity and
population above the Arctic Circle, for Russia the Arctic region holds a great deal of interest as
recognized by the scholarly community.
Initially, Rowe and Blakkisrud seek to examine how the Arctic is uniquely
conceptualized and constructed in terms of geopolitics by the Russian government.157 To
accomplish this goal Rowe and Blakkisrud analyze Russian media reporting on the Arctic and
Arctic issues coupled with qualitatively approaches regarding interviews with policy makers
from Arctic states.158 Ultimately, the authors discover the most prominent methodology utilized
by Russian policy makers in approaching the Arctic is to delineate the Arctic along lines related
to cooperative measures and items more closely linked to national sovereignty.159 Interestingly,
Rowe and Blakkisrud discover there is a value placed on cooperation with the West on Arctic
issues and approaches often are to distance Russia from geopolitical or geostrategic aims.160
Providing more detail on the work carried out by Rowe and Blakkisrud, Gritsenko details
the various Russian policy agendas regarding the Arctic that have been reported on in a variety
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of Russian media outlets.161 In analyzing six different newspapers Gritsenko discovered there
was a transformation in reporting on the Arctic before and after the Ukrainian Crisis.162 Before
the crisis, the newspapers were concerned with the economic opportunities and exploitation of
the Arctic region, but afterwards the papers were most concerned with the impact of sanctions
and securitization.163
Furthering this same effort regarding domestic perceptions of Russian political narratives,
Khrushcheva and Poberezhskaya delve into how the Arctic has been categorically represented
within Russian political narratives.164 In order to operationalize this goal, the authors examine
over a hundred various official documents available from the Russian president’s website.165
These documents reveal the focus of the Russian president in discussing the Arctic frame Russia
as an “Arctic Great Power” in emphasizing the various resource endowments, geographical
location, and resource endowments.166Khrushcheva and Poverezhskaya note this rhetoric does
not correlate with broader Russian policy in cooperation with the West on the Arctic. 167
In terms of broader economic and policy development for Russia, Henry’s detailing of
environmental movements within Russia is interesting for the purposes of this research.168
Overall, instead of drawing on domestic support for environmental objectives, environmentalist
movements in Russia rely on transnational support to achieve their objectives as the constraints
regarding domestic organization within the Russian Federation are so strict in prohibiting
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assembly.169 Ultimately, the efforts of these groups to enact change within their governments
have been linked to rhetorical change unless there is congruence between economic and
environmental goals.170
Finally, in terms of looking towards the future for Russia, Antrim inspects the impact of
Arctic climate change on the geopolitics of Russia.171 Historically, the Russian northern coastline
was an area with very little importance for the international community and Russian policy
objectives.172 Antrim contends as the Arctic climate warms and the sea-ice recedes the Russian
northern coastline will become one of the most important trade routes in the world, serving as the
means to catapult Russia from its status as a regional, landlocked power into a more conventional
power.173 Antrim concludes her discussion of the potential future of the Russian Arctic with a
variety of policy proposals for the United States in order to meet and mitigate this prospective
future.174
Each of these varying pieces paint a picture of a political system which is focused on
making the most economically for their constituents and developing the Arctic to improve the
status of Russia in the international system in terms of power and capability. However,
simultaneously to that drive has been the drive for the Russian cooperation with the West in
order to secure necessary support to make those dreams of an Arctic springboard to increase
power a reality. Thus, for Russia the Arctic becomes a mixed bag of cooperative policies and
nationalistic aims.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY
The Arctic has steadily gained prominence in the minds of scholars, policymakers,
scientists, and businessmen alike. Historically there was a significant degree of fascination with
the Arctic though the region was essentially closed off, and today the region is becoming
increasingly open due to climate change.175 Thus, it is important before delving into the case
studies of Russia and Canada to outline the methods utilized in the case studies, then to review
the Arctic Council, before finally justifying the timeframe of study.
Initially, from a methodological perspective it is vital to utilize a qualitative approach to
studying the Arctic region. The qualitative approach is the best methodological route to study the
region because avoids the current limitations on Arctic data, circumvents the pitfall of
temporality, and is more accommodating to unquantifiable aspects of the region. First, the Arctic
region possesses a host of interesting data related to variables relevant to a myriad of emerging
issues in the Arctic. However, there simply isn’t enough data related to key issues such as Arctic
developmental spending, surface military operations in the region, and Arctic ocean-going
traffic. This is of course due to either the classified nature of the data or small sample sizes with
only a few years of data collected. Moreover, the fact the Arctic Council has eight member-states
further limits the data even more from a statistical analysis perspective. Therefore, statistical
testing of datasets will not be pursued in this research and instead a qualitative approach is
necessary. Next, with temporally sequential or linked data there are often glaring skews within
statistical analyses. Given the relatively recent bump in Arctic interest, data on Arctic issues or
interests may be skewed even further on a year-to-year basis, thus causing further issues for
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statistical analyses of emerging Arctic phenomena. With this in mind, it is possible even if
enough data was available to carry out a statistical analysis of the Arctic region and the issues
most pertinent to it, then those results may not be as accurate to what is happening within the
region. Accordingly, it is best to then pursue a qualitative analysis for the best analytical results.
Finally, the Arctic is a region with a great degree of nuance and importance to the states which
have territory within its bounds. Though some of this nuance has been explored in surveys, even
more of the importance of the Arctic to the peoples of states like Russia, Canada, and Norway
has yet to be operationalized or simply cannot be quantified. With such a crucial piece of the
analytical puzzle outside of the reach of scholars for the purposes of statistical analysis, the only
recourse is to adopt a qualitative analysis to delve into the significance of the region in the
identity of the peoples and states calling the region home. Consequently, the best course of
action to study the region is to pursue qualitative studies into the Arctic.
As the premier international institution for the region, in addition to being one of the
primary mechanisms studied in the context of altering state behavior, it is important to briefly
explain the Arctic Council’s role in Arctic politics. Essentially, the Arctic Council operates as a
forum and an advisory body for its member-states, through its various meetings and its working
groups. Initially, the most prominent meetings of the Arctic Council are aptly termed the Arctic
Council Ministerial Meetings. Every two years the leading diplomats of the Arctic Council,
including observer states, meet to discuss the variety of reports, developments, and important
issues of the region which developed in those two years.176 The Arctic Council Meetings always
conclude with a declaration, though not legally binding to member-states, outline future goals of
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the Arctic Council and the means to achieve those goals.177 Other meetings often occur with
other, lower level diplomats throughout the year and are often related to specific reports, news,
or developments. Meetings like these enables states to stay on the same page on the issues
researched and studied by the Arctic Council’s Working Groups. The Arctic Council’s Working
Groups are tailor made departments mandated and funded by the Arctic Council to address
specific issues as they develop and to provide information to the Arctic Council’s member-states
and the public in the form of detailed reports.178 These reports then form the basis of Arctic
Council policy recommendations within Arctic Council Meetings following their publication,
and have historically formed the basis of the three legally binding Arctic Council resolutions on
issues such as Search and Rescue Operations and Fisheries Conservation. Both the Arctic
Council Meetings and the Arctic Council Working Groups form the two most important features
of the Arctic Council as the primary interactive portions of the Arctic Council with its memberstates, serving as vehicles to unify member-state policies throughout the region.
Given the historic interests within the region, notably territorial disputes and Arctic
based-national identities, it is important to identify a proper timescale for studying Arctic
relations and interactions. For the purposes of this research though, it is important to begin with
the enforcing of the Montreal Protocol which began in 1989.179 This timeframe enables a ready
examination of the development of scientific diplomacy related to the environment between the
United States and the Soviet Union, the founding of the Arctic Council, and the new way
forward on climate protection which saw its foundation within the Protocol. For the purposes of
the analysis in the case studies, this period of nearly thirty years will be divided into decades
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based around pivotal events in regards to the relationship of Arctic Council member-states; the
1996 founding of the Arctic Council, the 2004 publication of the first Arctic Climate Report, and
the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis. As explored within the following case studies, each of these events
was precipitated with specific policy goals rooted in the inclinations and national identity of each
state. Moreover, these events affected member-states on key issues related to the Arctic and
prompted a relative transformation of those affected policies. Thus, defining the three decades
since 1989 along the lines of these Arctic-critical events is both imperative and justified for the
study of the Arctic Council’s capability to alter its member-state policies.
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CHAPTER 5
THE TRUE NORTH STRONG AND FREE: CANADA AND THE ARCTIC COUNCIL
Of the most militaristic and nationalistic concerning the Arctic Region, it is appropriate to
begin first with the nation where the idea of the Arctic Council was first incepted; Canada. The
Arctic has held a paramount role in developing Canadian national identity, the most readily
available place to observe such importance is in the Canadian National Anthem which labels the
state as the “true North, strong a free.”180The oddity when concerning politics in Ottawa and
other provinces south of the Arctic Circle though is the percentage of Canadians who have
visited the Canadian Arctic is shockingly low given this Arctic importance.181 Therefore, before
delving into the various periods of interest to this case study it is vital to contextualize the
importance of the Arctic in Canadian politics both within the consciousness of the Canadian
Government and the Canadian Populace as a whole.
Historically, the Canadian Government has pursued policies to support Arctic ambitions
resonant with their constituents mainly in line with the view of the Arctic as a potential wealth
generator and the declaration of the Northwest Passage as an internal Canadian waterway.
Throughout Canadian history, the regions surrounding the Arctic Circle have drawn in citizens
and government officials to exploit natural resources. Discoveries in the northern reaches of
Canada of profitable goods such as furs, gold, timber, and oil ripe for the taking by enterprising
entrepreneurs have continually provoked Canadian policies regarding the Arctic region.182 And
just as was the case historically, today the Arctic region holds a great degree of promise as a
realm to make Ottawa wealthy from resources extracted from under the seabed to making other
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regions of provinces accessible for trade year-round for the first time in Canadian history.183
Thus, the Arctic for the Canadian government can in part be viewed as a new revenue stream to
finance other Canadian ambitions. Besides the draw of the potential natural riches of the Arctic,
the Arctic holds prominence to the Canadian government due to the declaration of the Northwest
Passage as an internal Canadian Waterway and Canada’s history of territory disputes with its
neighbors in the Arctic region.184 Shockingly few of these disputes have been resolved with
several of them being placed on the backburner simply due to the inaccessibility of the Arctic.
Oddly enough, Canada’s great relationship with its immediate neighbors of the United States and
Greenland is quite warm on dozens of other issues. Yet, in terms of Canadian politics these
territory disputes are galvanizing for the government, having historically propelled Canadian
political parties to success in national elections.185 In short, the restatements of Arctic territorial
disputes have served to galvanize Canadian national sentiment or otherwise securitize a central
aspect of Canadian national sentiment to increase buy-in from constituents into new policies.
Thus, Ottawa and Canadian political parties hold the Arctic in high esteem as a realm central to
its ambitions, either as fuel for the fires of the economy or as a means to increase popular support
for political ideas.
As previously mentioned the Canadian Arctic features quite heavily in Canadian national
identity; however, in terms of the average Canadian citizen it is important to note aspects more
usually readily divorced from conventional aspects of state power. Predominantly, this relates to
the Canadian northern wilderness as a place for conservation. Most Canadians, though they have
not visited the Canadian Arctic, can express an appreciation for the Wilds of Canada’s northern
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reaches.186 This idea of the Canadian frontier has featured strongly in Canada historically, and
today is mostly made up of vacationers visiting more rural, often forested parts of Canada. This
coupled with pushes towards conservation of species like the Polar Bear and Arctic Seal, has led
to a strong desire to preserve the Arctic environment and conserve its species as best as possible
within the Canadian populace.187 The push towards conservation began in the 1970’s and today
has led to the entrenchment of an identity of stewardship for the northern reaches of North
America, including the Arctic, among the Canadian population.188
Both the Canadian government and the Canadian population have entrenched ideas about
the Arctic region. While oddly competing with each other, these ideas are central to the policy
pursuits of Canada. Having briefly examined how the Arctic factors into Canadian identity for
the Canadian government and populace it’s now possible to delve into the case study in regards
to the interactions and effectiveness of the Arctic Council in altering Canadian national policies
since 1989. This period of nearly 30 years shall be divided into three sections based around the
central issues and watershed events for each decade; the 1996 Founding of the Arctic Council,
the 2004 Publication of the Arctic Climate Report, and the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis.
The Founding of the Council
The late 1980’s quickly developed into a whirlwind of events, one specific set of events
for the relationship of the Soviet Union and the West was within scientific research and action to
prevent the expansion of the hole in the Ozone Layer. The Montreal Protocol, the final
agreement related to this discussion among the global community, set the tone for the rest of the
1990’s alongside the collapse of the Soviet Union as a time for new connections between the
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former Eastern Bloc and the West.189 Particularly, the idea of an international organization
principally concerned with the Arctic region stemmed from the various scientific agreements
launched during the period of the late 1980’s and would become the Arctic Council in 1996.190
Therefore, it is important to detail Canada’s major concerns for the region before 1996, next
examine how the Arctic Council’s Founding affected those concerns, before finally detailing the
new policy direction for Canadian foreign policy for the remainder of the decade.
Initially, one of the primary concerns of Canadian foreign policy leading into the 1990’s
was maintaining the momentum on scientific research and conservation from the 1980’s
prompting Canada to propose eventually propose the Arctic Council. Canada’s willingness to
support such an initiative was simultaneously an attempt to further conservation goals, especially
in the adoption of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy by the Canadian Government in
1991, yet it also served to fulfill other national objectives for Canada.191 The discussions related
to the Strategy began in September 1989 directly as a result of the Montreal Protocol, focusing
on the study of the Arctic environment and conservation of the unique species calling the region
home.192 Domestically, in 1991 Canada established the Canadian Polar Commission via the
Canadian Polar Commission Act of 1991 to assist the Canadian Ministry of Indigenous and
Northern Affairs develop policy recommendations for the Canadian government, disseminate
information related to Canadian Arctic affairs, and collecting information related to the Canadian
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Arctic.193 This high level of concern for the Arctic environment fits into overall Canadian
identity as stewards of the Northern Reaches of North America while also fitting into
international cooperative agreements like Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy.
The Strategy would go on to be critical to the development of the Arctic Council, as the
Council was declared in AEPS’s Inuvik Declaration in 1996.194 Founded under the leadership of
Ottawa, the Arctic Council was essentially viewed by the Canadian government as the means to
achieve several critical policy objectives in line with how Canadians viewed the Arctic since the
Montreal Protocol.195 As outlined in the Ottawa Declaration of 1996, the Arctic Council was
principally established as an international forum to fulfill the broader environmental and
development objectives of AEPS while simultaneously providing a research forum for the eight
Arctic states to discuss issues wholly unique to the High North.196 Moreover, with the signing of
the Ottawa Declaration Canada was enshrined as the first of Chairman of the Arctic Council,
giving Canada the ability to set the agenda of the Arctic Council for its first two years.197 Given
the Canadian feeling of environmental stewardship in the Arctic domestically, these various
actions of Canada within its foreign environmental and conservation policies are not surprising.
At the conclusion of Canada’s first tenure as Chairman of the Arctic Council Canada oversaw
the first expansions of the Council into a variety of working groups geared towards specific
issues ranging from environmental protections, climate research, and conservation.198 Beyond
this, the Canadian tenure prioritized developing the Arctic region sustainably in both terms of the
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general Arctic economy to the human capital of the region.199 As Ottawa has a history of viewing
the Arctic as a potential economic bolster this is unsurprising, and the pursuit of these
environmental policies is wholly in line with Canadian Arctic thinking. Therefore, for Canada
this pivotal period of the 1990’s with the inception of the Arctic Council is an evolution
increasingly in favor of conservation, environmentalism, and scientific research to make them
both happen.
Following the conclusion of the first Canadian Chairmanship, Canada maintains and
supports the various environmental objectives of the new American Chairmanship from 19982000. The US policies coincided with nearly all of the Canadian policy objectives related to
environmental concerns and the propagation of human capital developments in the region,
prompting a somewhat steady amount of Canadian support for the Council and its objectives.200
The end of the 1990’s saw several reaffirming actions within Canada domestically to support the
various environmental and conservation initiatives of the Arctic Council with legislation like the
Canadian Environmental Protections Act of 1999.201 Furthermore, Canada had taken a vested
interest in maintaining the overall health of the Arctic region through the publication of various
reports and recommendations like the Canadian Arctic Contaminants Assessment Report in 1997
by Environment and Climate Change Canada and the passage of the Mackenzie Valley Resource
Management Act of 1998 by the Canadian Parliament202. Moreover, the intensifying
environmental provisions and positioning of Canadian policy during this period made a lasting
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impression, empowering the Canadian government to address pollution and preserve the
environment of Northern Canada.
For Ottawa, the 1990’s represented the culmination of several policy goals fitting in line
with Canadian national opinion and identity as stewards of the Arctic environment. Having
examined how this pivotal decade served to promote Canadian environmental policy while
providing for a larger international framework geared towards conservation oriented policy. The
undercurrent of conservation, environmentalism, and climate research has remained, for Canada
other areas of Arctic Policy have pushed their way to the forefront in Ottawa.
A Council of Action
The 2000’s were viewed as an opportunity for Canada to continue on its environmentalist
trajectory and to continue to support its ongoing projects. While those projects continued and
expanded throughout the 2000’s, this decade was also marked with significant shifts and changes
to other aspects of Canada’s Arctic policies. The primary event for this period for interactions
between Canada and the Arctic Council was the publication of the 2004 Arctic Climate Impact
Assessment and therefore it is critical to detail the general policy trend of Canada before 2004,
the immediate impact of the 2004 Arctic Climate report, and how Arctic policies transformed
after 2004.
Initially, Canadian policies related to the Arctic region prior to 2004 were similar to the
previous decade and coincided with broader Arctic Council goals. Canadian policy continued a
trajectory towards environmental sustainability and conservation through the enactment of
several pieces of legislation and the subsequent founding of new regulatory administrations. Of
particular note for the Canadian Arctic and sub-Arctic regions, are several Annual Reports from
the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement of 1993 and the 2003 Yukon Environmental and Socio-
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economic Assessment Act.203 Both of these items discuss various items of devolved power from
Ottawa to the local indigenous peoples and the provinces respectively on issues like human
development, sustainable development, and environmental management, fitting in line with
broad goals from the Arctic Council related to indigenous representation and environmental
management. Other than these environmental ambitions, Canada as a whole was growing
increasingly concerned with its economic sovereignty within the warming Canadian
Archipelago, due to its ongoing disputes related to the status of the Northwest Passage as a
Canadian Waterway.204 Beyond this growing concern, Canada maintained its various cordial
territorial disputes with its neighbors and its military readiness for Arctic operations through a
variety of training operations.205 All of these various policies and actions stayed true to the
national perceptions of the Arctic in Canada; however, the visibility of the Arctic in Canadian
politics was soon to be transformed.
2004 was a dramatic year for the Arctic Council and its relationship with its members and
the international community. For Canada it was a time period where Canadian territorial disputes
made international headlines. Canada’s ongoing territorial disputes with its neighbors never had
a great degree of international attention, having a relatively minor impact on its relationship with
them and amounting to no true concerns among policy makers as other Arctic issues continually
superseded them.206 However, in March of 2004 the Canadian government and populace began
in earnest to discuss the status of Canada’s military and those territorial disputes. March ended
with debate in the Canadian Parliament over budgetary allotments to the Canadian Military, with
Conservative MP Stockwell Day making note of Arctic Territorial Disputes as a means of
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highlighting the incumbent government’s lax military spending following the 9/11 Terrorist
Attacks.207 By the end of the month, the Canadian military would have made international
headlines for carrying out training operations surrounding Hans Island, a center of Canada’s
ongoing territorial dispute with Denmark and the only real dispute regarding land in the
Arctic.208 Operation Narwhal 04 took a small contingent of the Canadian military into the Arctic
as a simple annual drill to maintain military readiness and familiarity with Arctic conditions;
however, within a week it had made international headlines which termed the dispute the Hans
Island “Whisky War” with Denmark.209 Though the Whisky War was a conflict which consisted
of the placement of flags and alcohol by the Danish and Canadian militaries, it brought to light
the ongoing territorial disputes Canada held with its neighbors to the international community.
This event would achieve more significance in just a few short years to come as an indication of
the politicization of the Arctic for the Conservative Party of Canada. By November 2004 the
publication of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment put the Arctic Council and the state of the
Arctic climate into the households of states all around the globe.210 The ACIA described the
ongoing climate issues within the Arctic region and the dangers a warming Arctic posed to the
various species calling the region home. This was one of the first reports which broadcast the
effects of climate change to the world at large and succeeded in garnering the attention of the
international community to the problems and tribulations facing the Arctic and how the Arctic
Council was attempting to regulate, monitor, and confront those issues. Importantly, the
Assessment made sure to note the retreat of Arctic Sea Ice and how it was projected to continue
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to decline in the midst of a warming regional clime.211 By and large, the ACIA would attract a
great deal of concern related to environmentalism within Canada and thereby promote a further
commitment to environmental policy goals, it also served as an early sign that the Arctic may
become economically viable in the years to come.
The events of 2004 marked a significant turning point for Canadian public policy and
perception of the Arctic, but the more significant developments for the region would be to come
in just a few years. By and large the Canadian government continued its large pushes towards the
development of its northern provinces as economically viable zones with continual support to
bodies like the such as Nunavut Implementation Panel and Yukon Environmental and Socioeconomic Assessment Board which were founded under prior legislation and continually
published significant reports related to the conservation, health, and development efforts of the
Canadian government.212 In terms of how Ottawa would begin to approach the Arctic question in
other areas though, it is important to acknowledge the transformative election of 2006. Stephen
Harper campaigned successfully for the Conservative Party in Canada in part on a platform
concerned with the Arctic region and the territorial disputes Canada had within it, marking sure
to reiterate those campaign promises of the defense of Canadian Sovereignty in the North in
speeches in 2007, 2008, and 2010.213 This marks a significant turn for Canadian Arctic policy as
while the environmental objectives were pursued the Canadian military began to prepare itself
for more regular Arctic operations and patrols to reassert Canada’s claims, showing a divorce
from prior action regarding policy priorities in the region.214 While not game changing within the
region or for Canada’s relationship with its neighbors, the militarization of the Arctic is a policy
211

Ibid.
"Nunavut-Final Agreements and Related Implementation Matters," Government of Canada.; "Annual Reports,"
Yukon Environmental and Socio-economic Assesssment Board.
213
Dodds, "We Are a Northern Country: Stephen Harper and the Canadian Arctic."
214
Landriault, "Public Opinion on Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security." 161
212

58
shift for Canada in the midst of the Arctic Council’s stressing of cooperation across several
different Arctic Council Chairmanships. Moreover, this militarization and the notes of the ACIA
regarding sea ice coverage reinforced economic perceptions of the Arctic. This opening up of the
region to oceangoing travel potentially year-round attracted a great deal of interest both within
the hydrocarbons industry but also from the prospective trade route which could be considered to
be nearly wholly within Canadian waters.215 The insistence of the Northwest Passage being a
Canadian waterway is significant especially in light of ongoing preparations to make ready the
Canadian military for Arctic operations as part of the Canada First Defense Strategy of 2008.216
As odd as these competing goals seem for Canada, each fits very well into Canadian national
identity as both a steward of the Arctic environmentally and assert territorial claims regarding the
Arctic.
2004 represented a year of shifts for the Canadian people and government, and in fact the
Arctic region as a whole. Prior to 2004, the Arctic Council was relegated as an organization not
readily looked towards by the rest of the global community, and following 2004 the Arctic
Council made waves regarding the progression of climate change in the most vulnerable
environments of the world. By and large, Canada’s goals for the 2000’s fit into the broader
context of the Arctic Council’s policy objectives by supporting the sustainable development of
the Arctic Region’s human resources and continually studying the Arctic environment, yet there
was still the reassertion of nationalistic identity within the militarization of the Canadian Arctic
and the use of the region as a rallying cry for electoral purposes.
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The Council in Crisis
As the scientific community began to recognize the severity of the warming in the Arctic
region and informed the world about it, the amount of interest in the Arctic region increased.
This crescendo of interest in the Arctic was punctuated with a defining moment for the Arctic
Council during this period being the Ukrainian Crisis of 2014. Though this event occurred
outside of Arctic territory, it led to the boycott of that year’s Arctic Council meeting by both the
United States and Canada.217 Thus, it is important to examine the interactions between Canada
and the Arctic Council during this period in order to determine how national identity influenced
Canadian policy first by detailing how the start of the decade began, then examining the
immediate impact of the 2014 crisis on Canadian-Arctic Council relations, before finally
detailing how the relationship has progressed following 2014.
The opening of the 2010’s was the beginning of a new relationship between Canada and
the Arctic Council, therefore it is important to discuss how Canadian policies gelled with broader
Council goals and how Canada began its second tenure as Council Chair. Initially, throughout
the Norwegian, Danish, and Swedish terms of Arctic Council Chair the council was committed
to the environmental goals of years past.218 Each of these tenures saw major reports issued for
the whole of the Arctic on environmental research, including the Arctic Biodiversity Trends
Report of 2010.219 Moreover, the Swedish Chairmanship saw two of the three legally binding
agreements of the Arctic Council issued, those two agreements being the Agreement on
Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic of 2013 and the
Agreement on Cooperation in Aeronautical and maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic of
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2011.220 In the meantime, Canada signed onto both of these agreements and began to issue new
laws and regulations related to improving environmental conditions above the Arctic Circle.
Notably, Canadian protected areas both on land and at sea began their largest expansion during
this period, with most of those expansions occurring above the Arctic Circle.221 Moreover,
Canada improved its environmental regulations with the Canadian Environmental Assessment
Act of 2012 in the midst of this time.222 Furthermore, Canada also continued the process of
devolving governmental authority in the northern provinces of Canada in line with Arctic
Council objectives of indigenous representation with the Nunavut Planning and Project
Assessment Act of 2013.223 For the 2nd Canadian Tenure as Arctic Council Chair, the host of
environmental programs begun previously were continued or expanded upon, with the
implementation of the Framework for Action on Enhanced Black Carbon and methane
Emissions Reductions and the creation of the Arctic Marine Strategic Plan for 2015-2025 being
major highlights.224 However, the Canadian tenure differed on two key areas from prior
Chairmanship plans in that it specifically makes reference to the development of “responsible
arctic resource development” and the “establishment of safe arctic shipping.”225 While neither of
these objectives are particularly surprising for the Arctic Council to focus on, their meshing with
overall Canadian Arctic ambitions, identity, and the spike in interest within the region is
something rather new. All of this broadly fits into the aspect of Canada as an environmental
steward to the Arctic, but it also coincides with military spending and economic development
projects for the Canadian Arctic. Of greatest controversy was the announcement of the awarding
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of contracts for a small fleet of Arctic Patrol Vessels in 2011.226 While these vessels were argued
to be necessary under the Harper Administration, their ballooning cost of construction attracted a
phenomenal amount of ire from the opposition party and the Canadian populace.227 Additionally,
the Canadian military maintained its annual Arctic exercises without as great a deal of attention
as in 2004.228 While the economic development of the Arctic for this time was linked to
generalized Arctic Council objectives, the Canadian government pursued no expansions of
ongoing policies.
The Russian Federation’s actions in Ukraine are interesting especially in the context of
Arctic Council relations. The destabilization of Ukraine through Russian action in Eastern
Ukraine brought about a host of criticism from the globe, including Canada.229 Shortly following
the immediate start of the crisis in March of 2014, there was to be a brief meeting of the Arctic
Council to be held in April by Russia in Moscow.230 In response to the beginning of the Crisis,
the Harper Administration of Canada announced Canada, then the Chair of the Council, would
be boycotting the meeting to protest Russian action in Ukraine.231 Shortly thereafter, the United
States announced it would be boycotting the meeting as well in solidarity with Canada. While
not groundbreaking as far as policy has been concerned for the Arctic Council, the two most
powerful Western states on the council first boycotting a meeting in Russia did serve to put the
Arctic Council in the news again. While this was the first time in which a member state did
boycott a meeting of the Council, ultimately there was no dramatic effect to Council relations.232
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Yet, it serves as an interesting example of when broader Canadian policy influenced its
relationship with the Council while it was Council Chair.
The aftermath of the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis served to highlight how Canada’s relationship
with the Arctic Council interacts with broader Canadian policy and Canadian identity as a whole,
and this is relevant in the years after 2014. Most notably, Canada continued to purse nationalistic
policies in line with Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future
published in 2009.233 This strategy outlines four central pillars in terms of how Canadian policy
will be organized to engage the Arctic region in the following order of importance; sovereignty
assertion, economic development, environmental protection, and northern governance.234 This
essential roadmap of Canadian policy follows the objectives laid out by the Arctic Council in
terms of including terms of development for the economic, environmental, and representation for
indigenous peoples; however, the prioritization of sovereignty issues for Canada is not surprising
given the level of international interest within the region. Since 2010 the number of observer
states on the Arctic Council has grown to include China and India, with a great deal of interest
being levied towards the Northwest Passage as an international trade route.235 Canada has
maintained a host of policies geared towards the latter three pillars of its Arctic Strategy,
including new environmental protect legislation and signing the Agreement to Prevent
Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean to preserve the Arctic environment
as much as possible.236 Though environmental programs progress as they had for Canada before,
new programs emerged to support the economic development of the northern Canadian
provinces. In 2018 Ottawa launched Strategic Investments in Northern Economic Development
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(SINED), a program designed to bolster the economic growth, diversity, and activity of northern
Canada by offering governmental support for those endeavors committed to economically
develop Canada’s Northern provinces.237 Though all of this complies with Canadian ideas about
the Arctic region from stewardship to exploitation, the nationalistic aspects of Arctic sovereignty
for Canada have steadily gained ground. While Canada and Denmark did announce in 2018 to
meet in order to resolve the Hans Island dispute, Canada has continued to maintain strong
policies related to rebuilding the Canadian Armed Forces to more effectively operate within the
Arctic region in order to protect Canadian Arctic sovereignty.238 The principle objectives of the
2010 Arctic Integrating Concept from the Harper Administration was held over by the Trundeau
Administration, including the bolstered readiness of Canadian Armed forces to act within the
Arctic region.239 While not completely militaristic as with increased Arctic traffic there will be a
need to carry out more search and rescue operations in the region and to support scientific
research. This duality is most clearly observed within the 2016 expansion of the Nunavut
Training Centre to become a hub for Canadian Arctic operations potentially year-round, which
coincides with the announcement for the hope of opening more training locations and military
bases within the Canadian Arctic by the Canadian Armed Forces in accordance with the opening
of several other Arctic facilities by Russia.240 While the overall goals of the troops does fit within
the broader context of Arctic Council goals, the increased support for Canadian Arctic operations
does fit within the broader context of Canadian national identity and the securitization of Arctic
sovereignty, specifically related to the defending powerful identity markers like the Northwest
Passage. In sum, the period following the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis has been full of diverse actions
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by Canada in both putting forth policies to protect the Arctic environment while supporting its
economic development and pursuing cooperative policies in the international community in the
midst of developing the military capabilities to protect territorial sovereignty.
The 2010’s have been a whirlwind for Canadian Arctic Policy. The Ukrainian Crisis of
2014 clearly demonstrates the Canada’s policy concerns in other areas of foreign policy can
influence its interactions within the Arctic Council. Throughout this whole decade, as in the
previously examined decades, Canadian policy has conformed to the general thrust of Canadian
national identity which prioritizes environmental stewardship, preservation of national
sovereignty, and economic development.
Case Study Conclusions
Since 1989 Canadian policy has shown a ready prioritization of Arctic Climate concerns,
readily meeting the various touch-points of Arctic Council goals. The general trend of Canadian
policy does heartily coincide with Canadian national identity, but over time Canadian national
policies have become increasingly concerned with Canadian objectives related to traditional hard
power related to economic development and military power is rising to the top of Canada’s
policy hierarchy. In the midst of these policies, Canada has remained an ever supportive member
of the Arctic Council and done its due diligence to meet the Council goals related to
environmentalism, conservation, and climate research.
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CHAPTER 6
THE POLAR BEAR: RUSSIA AND THE ARCTIC COUNCIL
The state with the most significant Arctic Coastline and the largest amount of people
living above the Arctic Circle is naturally the Russian Federation. For Russians, the Arctic is an
important symbol of national identity, expansion, and bold exploration, which all harkens back to
the periods of expansion from throughout Russian history and tradition.241 The Arctic has lain on
the thoughts and minds of modern Russian politicians, scientists, and military professionals
because of the power possibilities and options provided by the region.242 Today, those territorial
claims persist in the Arctic Ocean and the Arctic holds a special place in the minds of both
Russian policy makers and the Russian populace as a critical realm for the future of the Russian
state because it is simultaneously an access point to the rest of the world, a means of economic
development, and a realm of cooperation.
Initially for Russia and Russians, the Arctic represents a lifeline to the rest of the world.
The ports of call Russia has on the Barents Sea are capable of handling a range of vessels from
Russia’s blue-water navy to merchant fishing vessels, representing some of the most robust port
facilities in the region.243 Moreover, the Russian northern coast remains open for longer than the
other coastlines of the Arctic Ocean, enabling for a longer traveling season in the Northeast
Passage than the Northwest Passage.244 This interaction between Russians and the Arctic Ocean
stretches back in time as well; the modern deep U-shaped hull design of modern icebreakers was
first brought into being from Russian adaptations of the vessels of indigenous northern
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peoples.245 With the introduction of global warming into the equation and the reduction of seaice thickness, the Arctic is readily being viewed as the next critical means for global economic
transportation and is being hyped as such within the Russian government.246 In sum, for Russia
and Russians the Arctic Ocean was, is, and is becoming a highway to transport goods from one
part of the country to the other.
Just as was the case with Canada, for Russia the Arctic has become increasingly viewed
as the means towards economic prosperity and development. As previously mentioned the Arctic
holds vast reserves of oil and natural gas, and there are several states with significant interests in
tapping into those deposits with Russia essentially leading the charge.247 The geologic
morphology of the Arctic seabed has a great deal of the oil and natural gas reserves squarely
within Russian territory, and Russia has been willing to exploit those resources for their own
gain.248 Surprisingly, such action is applauded by Russians as a means to restore Russia to the
status of a superpower in the international arena, much like the challenging of the United States
on international issues.249 To that end, the Kremlin has made it a priority to develop the Russian
Arctic into an economically active region to the benefit of the Russian economy and to further
propagate their on popularity at home.
Finally, there is still a great deal of scientific interest for Russia and Russians in regards
to the Arctic, related to conservation and environmentalism. During the Soviet Period, Russia
and Russians approached environmentalism as an unnecessary luxury or inhibitor on the
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economic progress of the state.250 Today, those same beliefs largely hold true. Though there has
been some push towards environmental consciousness on the part of Russian policymakers,
domestic organizations, and local people, unfortunately environmental concerns are not nearly as
important to Russians as with other members of the Arctic Council as a great deal of the Russian
environmentalist movement requires outside support.251 However, the acknowledgement of the
desires of other states within the region related to environmentalism has led Russian policy to
primarily push for cooperation with the West on such issues in order to build critical cooperative
bridges.252 Thus, though there is some importance within the region in regarding environmental
efforts and study, for Russia and Russians there simply is not the same push for
environmentalism as within other states.
The Arctic remains an integral part of Russian identity, though it fundamentally differs in
its approach to the region compared to other Arctic states. Regardless though, the perspectives of
the Kremlin and the Russian people serve to frame the policy approaches of the region and can
offer unique insights into the Russian relationship with the Arctic Council.
Cooperation of the Post-Cold War
For the Russian Federation, the Arctic represents an interesting area of cooperation with
the West. This stretches back to the Soviet period prior to 1989, with the settlement of the
maritime border between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Bering Strait.253 In a
speech in Murmansk in 1987, Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev set the tone for the interactions
between the West and the Soviet Union in relation to the Arctic as a region of cooperative study
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and research by outlining the Soviet Union’s Arctic Policy.254 This spirit of goodwill towards
mutual climate research set a tone for environmental cooperation between the West and the
Soviet Union which is best explored centered around the 1990’s and the founding of the Arctic
Council in 1996. In order to explore this period it is critical to first outline the general Russian
and Soviet policies related to the Arctic Council before 1996, then detail how 1996 led to
immediate changes within those policies, before finally looking to the impact the Council had on
Russian policy following the immediate effects of 1996.
As the Soviet Union wavered and then collapsed, an important part of its legacy to the
newly formed Russian Federation came in the form of its engagement in Arctic agreements
related to climate study and conservation. The Soviet Union, and the Russian Federation,
supported the ideas related to the Montreal Protocol, applying those rules within its borders to
help facilitate the preservation of the ozone layer.255 The Soviet Union joined other Arctic states
in signing onto the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy spearheaded by Finland to further
study the impacts of climate change and pollution on the Arctic Ocean.256 For the Russian and
prior Soviet government, this continual interaction and cooperation in the Arctic space was
viewed as a major cooperative boon to the overall relationship between itself and the West. To
further this end, Moscow engaged in the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the Barents Regional
Council in 1993 in order to facilitate cooperation to develop the Barents Sea region, which is one
of the most populous and economically active portions of the Russian Arctic.257 Furthermore, in
1993 Russia and Norway negotiated to increase the scope and scale of the Joint Norwegian254
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Russian Fisheries Commission to include long-term fishery conservation as part of a broader
effort of cooperation and conservation in the Arctic.258 All of these actions coincide with how the
Russian people and government approached the Arctic region, as a realm necessary to interact
with in order to cooperate with their neighbors and to engage on advancing scientific knowledge
of the Arctic.
With this in mind, 1996 becomes a continuation of this engagement with the West over
the Arctic, especially with the founding of the Arctic Council. For Moscow, the Arctic Council
represented an opportunity to engage with the West to simultaneously achieve several goals
related to its Arctic policies. As previously mentioned, the Murmansk Speech of 1987 outlined
Soviet Arctic policy and Russian Arctic policy by 1996 were quite similar, the most important
issue areas for the Russian government and people concerning the Arctic were the economic
development of the Russian Arctic, the fostering of cooperation between Russia and the West,
and the sharing of scientific research across members.259 To this end, the Arctic Council was a
major boon to Russia as it enabled a clear road forward on each of these issues through the
various working groups of the Council. Therefore, for the Russian government and to a degree
the Russian people the Arctic Council represented a means to better develop, access, and interact
with both the West and their northernmost regions as a continuation of prior, successful policies.
The latter half of the 1990’s were a continuation of previous policies enacted by the
Russian federation, with a continued focus on developing a cooperative relationship with
Western states and some rising usage of international institutions to resolve territorial disputes.
Initially, Russia remained committed to cooperating with the West at nearly every opportunity
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afforded to it by joining the Northern Dimension in 1999 alongside Iceland, Norway, and the
European Union to facilitate cooperation among European Arctic States by engaging in a midst
of policy areas through its own working groups similar to the same objectives pushed by the
Arctic Council in areas such as environmental issues, public health and well-being,
transportation logistics, and culture.260 This correlation to Arctic Council objectives is not
without warrant as every state signing onto the Northern Dimension is also a member of the
Arctic Council, save the European Union, thereby enabling Russia to institutionally double dip
on areas of major concern for policy objectives. In the midst of this re-engagement period
between Russia and the West, Moscow also ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Seas in 1997 to more effectively interact with its neighbors and the international
community at large regarding Russia’s coastal waters.261 Each of these policies coincided with
pushes towards furthering traditional policy views of the Arctic region and how the region could
be used as a means of cooperation with the West on key issues.
Thus, having examined the 1990’s it is clear the overall theme for Russian policy
engagement with the Arctic Council remained continual cooperation with the West on key issues
related to the Russian Arctic. By and large the traditional ideas of economic exploitation and a
hyperborean manifest destiny remained prominent in the minds of Russian policy makers and
citizens, yet those ideas were pushed to the side in favor of utilizing the Arctic as a broader
means of engagement with the West on communal issues.
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A New Millennium for a New Russia
The Russian Federation entered into the 21st Century with a relatively new President
with a new vision for the future. Despite the change in leadership and century, overall policy
objectives for Moscow remained congruent with the policies of previous years. As the 2000’s
advanced and the impacts of climate change became more apparent with the publication of the
Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, the ordering of the priorities of the Russian Federation began
to change. To best examine this transformation of Russian policy in the first decade of the 21st
Century it is critical to examine what how Russia interacted with the Arctic Council prior to
2004, how 2004 altered Russian policy approaches to the Arctic, and finally consider how
Russian policy changed in the latter half of the decade.
The start of the 21st Century can be described as a mixture of a continuation of the policy
decisions from the previous decade and new concerns related to the restoration of economic
authority. First, within the international community Russia remained committed to the utilization
of international institutional frameworks to facilitate the cooperative opportunities with former
rivals. Notably, Russia remained committed to the variety of institutions it had joined in years
previously, while also beginning to utilization of institutional frameworks to resolve ongoing
issues. Particularly, in 2001 the Russian government submitted case documents to UNCLOS in
order to resolve its territorial claims in the Arctic Ocean.262 This action in particular leads into
the next important development for Russian foreign policy for the early 2000’s. The Russian
economy had been in shambles throughout the 1990’s and the primary focus of Moscow in the
early 2000s was to regain lost economic ground. As a consequence of this, items like
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environmental policy began to languish under the weight of the decentralization of the 1990’s
with no real domestic environmental code enforcement due to continual governmental
reshuffling.263 Fortunately, this period also began to see the tide turning on this environmental
issue with the passing of the 2002 Federal Law on Technical Regulation in actually creating the
start of an adequate framework for the enforcement of environmental regulations.264 Though this
seems off in comparison to the traditional objectives of the Russian people and government,
during the early 2000’s the quality of the environment of Russia degraded to the point where
80% of Russian citizens began to implore their government to take action to combat pollution
and environmental degradation.265 Therefore, though there was not a significant amount of
interesting interaction with the Arctic Council during this period, broader Russian policy was
congruent with Arctic Council goals.
For Russian policy, the most significant year in the 2000’s was by far the year 2004
because it represented the first time Russia would be the Chair of the Arctic Council and the
publication of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment. Of all of the actions of the early 2000’s,
the Russian Chairmanship of the Arctic Council stands out as a significant event due to the
almost copy and pasted nature of several of Russia’s policy objectives. Notably a great deal of
the objectives for the Russian Chairmanship were similar to previous chairmanship objectives
related to increasing cooperation, council visibility, and scientific research with the introduction
of events such as the International Polar Year.266 However, the initial Russian objectives also
included several new clauses related to economic development and preparing the region for
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international, transarctic shipping.267 The inclusion of the trade route objective in particular is a
groundbreaking event as it represents the direct inclusion of policy objectives beneficial
primarily to a single state into the council goals. Nevertheless, all of the policy objectives
expressed by Russia during their chairmanship did fit with Russian ideas related to the Arctic
and the broader developmental goals of the Arctic Council. Moreover, the publication of the
Arctic Climate Impact Assessment of 2004 was a groundbreaking publication for the Arctic
Council’s international visibility and in the case of Russia was of no exception. For Russia, the
Assessment represented an opportunity to re-engage with environmental policy and to begin to
prepare for the economic exploitation of the Arctic. These paradoxical goals were relatively
quickly seized upon, given the problems Russia faced earlier in the decade. In response to
environmental concerns, Moscow began to rectify problems with its environmental regulatory
framework by strengthening water management, forest codes, and improving resource
protections related to the marine environment.268 In regards to beginning to examine the
economic opportunities of the Arctic, Russia began to more readily consider oil exploration in
the region to further bolster the Russian economy within its declared Arctic policies.269 All of
this is again wholly congruent with the nationalistic approaches of Russia in regards to the Arctic
as a region. 2004 highlighted the paradoxes of Russia’s actions regarding the Arctic and overall
Arctic Council objectives, yet more changes and challenges for Russia were to come.
Following 2004’s publication of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment and the start of
Russia’s Arctic Council Chairmanship had lasting impacts on the policies concerning the Arctic
region. In the latter half is best broadly characterized by the continuation of cooperation and the
resurgence of economic nationalism. First, the continued institutional cooperation pursued by
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Russia was extremely telling during this time, and in no other area is it best observed in the
Salekhard Declaration. The Salekhard Declaration concluded the Russian Chairmanship of the
Arctic Council, describing the success of the various Arctic Council initiatives pursued during its
tenure including the establishment of the Arctic Contaminants Action Program, the successful
integration of Barents Euro-Arctic Council’s Working Group on Environment into Arctic
Council activities related to environmental protections, and the successful gathering of the
Moscow Symposium on Prevention and Mitigation Of Emergency Situations in the Arctic.270
The most important exclusion from the Salekhard Declaration was the item related to preparing
the Arctic region as a hub for trade which was included in the Chairmanship Priority paper from
2002, instead the only mention of maritime activity in the Arctic strictly relates to working group
projects studying the possibility of pollution in the region in the Arctic Marine Shipping
Assessment draft.271 Removing such an important and long-lasting piece of Russian policy goals
shows a significant development to fulfill communal goals as Council Chair instead of individual
ones by the end of Russia’s Council Chair tenure. However, such inclinations were not
completely absent in general Russian policy. In 2008 Russia engaged in the Arctic Ocean
Conference, a meeting outside of the Arctic Council, alongside every other Arctic coastal state
held in Greenland.272 Ultimately, this meeting decreed unanimously in the Ilulissat Declaration
every state with territorial disputes should pursue bilateral negotiations in order to resolve their
disputes instead of pursuing multilateral resolutions to often longstanding territorial claims.273
These policies are completely in line with how the Russian government and people have
approached the Arctic region, and the idea of Arctic as a tool to achieve great power status once
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more. In the years after 2004, Russia began to seriously pursue undersea exploration within the
Arctic region and pursuing oil exploration off of the Russian northern coast. This led to the
publicized Russian flag planting on the Lomonosov ridge in 2007 by the Arktika 2007
expedition, correlating with modifications to Russian submissions to UNCLOS regarding
Russian territorial claims.274 Furthermore, Russia continued support its development of Arctic
Oil reserves during this period to enhance these strategic resources for Russia. Following 2004
China began to develop interests in the Arctic, partnering with Russia to finance oil exploration
in off of the northern coast of Siberia.275 Each of these events received some international outcry
related to the potential pollution of oil into the delicate Arctic environment and the inflammatory
possibilities of Russian flag planting on the Arctic seabed; however, on a whole these actions
were popular domestically and not breaking stride with the Arctic Council’s broader objectives
of conservation, scientific research, and economic development.
The first decade of the 21st century was a significant one for the Russian Federation.
Russian policy ideas related to cooperation with the West were pursued concurrent with policies
to enrich the Russian state and people. Ultimately, this was a decade of paradoxes for Russia,
beginning with strengthening environmental protections and ending with the beginning of the
exploitation of a unique, fragile environment it had pledged to protect. Yet, these actions were
applauded by Russians and fit snuggly with Russian national identity in relation to the Arctic.
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A Self-Inflicted Crisis
By the early 2010’s the Russian Federation had continued to engage in the same manner
of agreements it had always pursued in regards to the Arctic. Unfortunately though, its actions in
Eastern Europe would come back to haunt Moscow’s Arctic ambitions. To best examine how
these actions in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea impacted Russian Arctic policy it is
critical to first detail how the decade began for Moscow in the Arctic, then the immediate
impacts of 2014’s Ukrainian Crisis, before finally investigating Russia’s policies following the
crisis.
Moscow’s policies related to the Arctic followed the same broad policy objectives from
past decades, thus the start of the 2010’s can be considered to be a continuation of prior policy
which is best observed within the maintained institutional cooperation for Russia and the
continued focus on economic progress. The start of the 2010’s experienced a great degree of
groundbreaking institutional norm creation with the Arctic Council passing two new legally
binding resolutions for its members. The Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and
Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic of 2011 and the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine
Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic of 2013 established new ground for the
Arctic Council in regards to its members, as prior to these agreement the Council had no real
authority to coerce its members into action one way or another.276 Russian compliance and
participation with these two legally binding resolutions is significant, and when coupled with
Moscow’s other policy expeditions into the Arctic highlight a cooperative streak in Russian
policy. For instance, in 2010 Russia and Norway finally concluded their longstanding territorial
dispute in the Barents Sea with the Barents Sea Treaty of 2010, a significant development and
success of bilateral negotiations to resolve just one of the many territorial disputes Russia
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possesses with its Arctic neighbors.277 Though Russia successfully settled that territorial dispute,
her financing of various expeditions to serve other claims on the disputed Lomonosov Ridge and
the expansion of the Russian Exclusive Economic Zone under UNCLOS adds fuel to the fire for
ongoing Arctic Ocean territorial disputes.278 Each of these actions and events fits within the
broader context of Russian policy and identity, serving to further highlight the cooperative
objectives of Moscow and engage within power seeking behavior in line with previous Russian
approaches to the region. This secondary focus on the Arctic as an area of power acquisition
comes into much greater prominence during this period for the Russian government due to
Russian oil extraction efforts and the action taken to secure the Northeast Passage. Initially,
Moscow sought to increase the amount of oil extracted within the Arctic region by providing
support for the efforts of state-majority-owned oil company Rosneft. Beginning in 2010 Rosneft
sought to increase the amount of oil it produced within the region by funding the construction of
the Obskaya-Bovanenkovo Pipeline and partnering with Exxon Mobile to secure increased
funding for oil exploration in the Russian Arctic.279 In the midst of these efforts to secure access
to the natural resources of the Arctic region, the Russian military also committed to developing
the assets needed to secure economic prosperity in protecting the Northeast Passage such as the
reopening of Soviet-era Naval installations throughout the Russian Arctic.280 Furthermore, the
Russian navy resumed naval air patrols over the northern coast of Russia in order to more
efficiently patrol the waterway alongside other activity to support the safety of the Northeast
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Passage.281 These actions are helping to facilitate the transformation of the Russian Arctic Coast
into a region regularly monitored and made safe for oceangoing traffic in order to secure what is
perceived to be an avenue of economic prosperity in the eyes of the Russian government and
people.282 Both sides of the duality of Russian action in the Arctic region during the early years
of the 2010’s speak to actions pursued in order to meet the policy goals of the Russian
Federation, with congruence to the broader goals of the Arctic Council.
2014 served as a hallmark that Russia could not act with impunity without the West
imposing sanctions upon them. Though the Ukrainian Crisis served to derail a great deal of the
ongoing relationship between the West and Russia, the Arctic Council was insulated from this
sanctioning process beyond the initial boycott by Canada and the United States.283 In order to
more efficiently explore this it is critical analyze where the policy breakdowns where between
the West and Russia over the Ukrainian crisis and where there were continuations in spite of the
disagreements related to Ukraine. Initially, the most visible breakdown between the West and
Russia was over the status of an Arctic Council Meeting to be held in Moscow just scant days
following the beginning of the Ukrainian Crisis.284 Beyond this visible backlash against Russian
action there was no immediate response from the Arctic Council in regards to the Crisis itself,
yet it is critical to not that several key programs Russia had been previously preparing for
floundered due to the implementation of sanctions against Russia from the West. Of greatest
significance to Russia was the ceasing of much of the Western support for Russian oil
exploration including the canceling of the previously mentioned Exxon-Rosneft discussion, the
removal of Norwegian technological support for the construction of Arctic Off-shore oil rigs, and
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overall Western coordination in regards to military readiness for Arctic operations.285 In the
midst of this breakdown between Russia and the West, the Russian military continued to increase
the militarization of the Russian Kola Peninsula in the Barents Sea to protect Russian Arctic
interests.286 Though not solely for Arctic Operations, Moscow’s military build-up for the Arctic
represented a major sticking point for Western relations which were amplified by the rest of
Russia’s actions throughout Eastern Europe in 2014.287 Oddly enough though, other aspects of
the relationship Russia held with the Arctic Council and with other Council members concerning
the Arctic region remained unchanged beyond the sanctions. Of most shocking instance of
continuation of cooperation between the Russian coast guard and their western counterparts over
search and rescue in order to comply with pre-existing Arctic Council agreements.288 Beyond
this particular highlight, there was continuing of the energy trade between Russia and European
states, ongoing fishery negotiations with Norway, ongoing discussions related to Danish
submissions to UNCLOS in regards to territorial claims on the Lomonosov Ridge, and the
adopting of the Polar Code by the International Maritime Organization under the
recommendation of the whole of the Arctic Council.289 So, though the Ukrainian Crisis derailed
some of Russia’s more self-serving programs and policies it does not appear to have derailed the
longest-lasting and most successful policy for the Arctic region: Arctic Cooperation. Thereby,
the preservation of the overall Arctic vision of the Russian Federation and people is preserved in
their actions with the West during the Ukrainian Crisis, because though there was significant
pushback against Russia’s actions in Ukraine there was not a detrimental amount of derailment
to Russia’s Arctic engagements.
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The Russian Arctic Policy post-Ukrainian crisis is still a work in progress, but it has all of
the trappings which have previously characterized the Arctic policies of Russia for both good
and ill. For Moscow the Arctic remains as it ever has been in the 21st century, a tool to return
Russia to the might of bygone days and a means to facilitate cooperative engagement with the
West.290 The Russian government has continually held the view the Arctic would become a
means to redevelop the Russian economy to its Soviet-period heights, and to this end Moscow
has continued to support the exploration of off-shore oilfields and other natural resources to
exploit in the Arctic region just as it always has.291 Moreover, the Russian military has continued
to expand its presence above the Arctic Circle by reopening continuing to reopen Soviet-era
naval installations in order to provide births for the vessels projected to utilize the Russian
Northeast Passage.292 Thus, the preparations of the Russian government has been making to
transform their northernmost provinces into an economically active region have continued only
slightly been setback by the events of 2014. As these nationalistic policies continue, Russia has
also contributed to three significant developments of international cooperation which has been
fostered by the Arctic Council. First, the Joint Russian-US funded and third legally binding
Arctic Council resolution, the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific
Cooperation of 2017, which Russia signed with all other Arctic Council members.293 Next,
Russia continued its cooperation on search and rescue operations in line with its prior
commitments to the Arctic Council both with its immediate neighbors and those further afield by
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contributing to the establishment of the Arctic Coast Guard Forum in 2015.294 Finally, the
actions bearing the most recent fruit from the relationship between the Arctic Council and
Moscow have been regarding a variety of work related to fisheries management, from the
Declaration on the Central Arctic Ocean in 2015 preventing the exploitation of the Arctic Ocean
fisheries to the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic
Ocean signed in October 2018 furthering the 2015 declaration.295 This focus on cooperation in
the midst of preparing for military action in the Arctic is striking, and wholly in line with
Russian views on the Arctic and broader Russian government policy towards its rivalry with the
West.
Though the end of the 2010’s at the time of writing is still somewhat far-off, the
implementation of policies throughout this period reinforces the complexities of Russian action
in the Arctic. On one hand Moscow habitually assists in communal goals and institutions while
focusing on how it can best exploit the Arctic region to serve its own ends. One thing is
seemingly certain throughout these policies; Russia will continue to pursue such policies it
believes best serve its own interests as is the case with all states.
General Trend
Since 1989 Russia has experienced several extremes of instability, uncertainty, and
crises; however, the Arctic policies of the Russian Federation have remained stable and
consistent since they were first announced by Gorbachev in Murmansk in 1987. The push for
cooperation with the West on scientific issues, environmentalism, and conservation have proven
successful time and time again, with a variety of international institutions, laws, and norms

294

Byers, "Crises and International Cooperation: An Arctic Case Study." 386
Office of the Spokesperson, "U.S. Signs Agreement to Prevent Unregulated Commerical Fishing on the High
Seas of the Central Arctic Ocean."
295

82
having been pushed forward by Russia and the West together. In the midst of it all, Russia still
remains committed to restoring itself at least to its former might by utilizing the Arctic as a tool
to achieve those aims by the exploitation of its natural resources, geographic location, and size.
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CHAPTER 7
THE NEW ARCTIC NORMAL
The general trends of both Russia and Canada point towards two states moving towards
Arctic Council objectives in areas related to conservation and environmentalism while intensely
pursuing national interests in other important areas of concern closely linked to their respective
national identities. Therefore, with the completion of the reviews of the case studies of Russian
and Canadian interactions with the Arctic Council since 1989, it is now possible to return to the
null hypothesis of national identity does not limit the ability of the Arctic Council to alter state
policies. Given the propensity of both Russia and Canada since the Cold War to continually
pursue their own national interests in line with the popular conceptions of the Arctic as a region
continually over the near entirety of the thirty year period, it is possible to reject the null
hypothesis. This rejection is possible because conditions of national identity establish
“untouchable” areas of interests for states; thereby, making it difficult for the Arctic Council to
create inroads to alter policies affecting those interests.
Thus, it is possible to return to the research question of under what conditions can the
Arctic Council facilitate cooperative policy developments in its members? Utilizing the
framework offered by the logic of habit and the importance of identity discourses related to
international politics, it is clear national identity does play a role in influencing the effectiveness
of the Arctic Council in propagating cooperative policies among its members. Conditions of
strong national identity related to key interests cultivate “untouchable” zones for states, making it
difficult for the Arctic Council to create inroads to alter policies affecting those interests.
Essentially, the more closely held the specific national interest is to the identity of the state the
less likely it is to be transformed from Arctic Council interactions if the transformation would
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leave the state in a weaker position then had not pursued the self-serving policy. This roadblock
stems from the developed habits both on the part of government interactions with their
constituents and government approaches to those same issues within the international community
under the prevailing conditions of uncertainty.
Together, the increase in fungibility with the propagation of untouchable areas of national
policy by Council members causes the decline of the uniqueness of Arctic politics in critical
areas of engagement between and among states. The encroachment of non-Arctic policies into
the Arctic realm propagates zones of normalization between members of the Arctic Council
despite the ongoing cooperation in areas where dissimilar national identities converge. Thus, in
this case it is necessary to adopt Copeland’s framework for analyzing trade routes and the
security of those routes impacts interstate relations in terms of geopolitics and continual ice
decline.296
The normalization of Arctic politics serves to also shed light on the motivations of the
usage of national identity discourses as a framing device for national interests. Essentially, the
nationalistic appeal towards the identity of their constituents serves as a legitimizing factor for
the pursuit of national interests within the Arctic region. Observed within the context of the case
studies, both Canada and Russia used domestic appeals towards national identity related to
Arctic sovereignty in order to purposely propagate policy areas which could not be infringed
upon by the Arctic Council. Thus, identity has become a rouse for national interests and is used
to create untouchable zones closely affiliated with the national interests of the state. Given its
widespread success in cultivating policy sticking points for international relations among Arctic
states, governments have been falling back on national identity in order to justify not bowing
down to the suggestions or agreements and in order to increase domestic support for incumbent
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governments.297 Moreover, the creation of untouchable zones of policy for the Arctic Council is
correlated to increased fungibility of national power related to decreases in the coverage of
Arctic Ocean sea ice. As the ice has retreated, arguments regarding national identity have
gathered steam and clout within their respective states, fueled in some cases by governmental
rhetoric, while those same states have continued to act in their own best interests regarding the
region. Therefore it is critical to acknowledge the usage of national identity as a means to
increase popular support for the state pursuit of national interests.298
To better understand how the influence of national identity couple with increased
fungibility generates a normalization of Arctic regional politics it is critical to first offer a more
in-depth exploration of the creation of untouchable policy zones, next detail how the process of
normalization is usurping traditional Arctic habits, then examine the impact of normalization on
critical areas, before finally offering a forecast for the future of international relations in the
Arctic.
The Creation of Untouchable Zones
The coupling of closely held national identity with the hard power interests of states, in
areas such as economics and national security, presents a major roadblock for cooperative
processes. Essentially, the blending of these two ideas creates zones of untouchable policy areas,
where it is difficult to foster communal inclinations within the domestic political space of states.
However, these zones are not spontaneously generated within states or communities; instead they
grow over time from the interactions between the national identity of a state and the habits states
develop within the international community. Therefore, in order to understand how the Arctic
297

Dodds, "We Are a Northern Country: Stephen Harper and the Canadian Arctic."; Khrushcheva and
Poberezhskaya, "The Arctic in the Political Discourse of Russian Leaders: The National Pride and Economic
Ambitions."
298
Griffiths, "The Shipping News - Canada's Arctic Sovereignty Not on Thinning Ice."

86
Council has failed to create significant inroads to foster cooperation on a broad spectrum of
issues it is important to understand how these untouchable zones are generated within Russia and
Canada.
In the case of Russia and Canada in the Arctic, the primary driver of the generation of
untouchable zones is a combination of the desire for a reward in capability and a strong national
identity related to attaining such capabilities. Fundamentally, this power seeking behavior
inhibits the ability of policies identified by the national identity of the state and enshrined in the
policies of the state to be able to be shifted by organizations. For the Arctic region, such
untouchable areas have emerged due to the reduction in sea-ice and the increasing fungibility of
power in the region. The inclusion of the ability to act upon these emerging national interests
fueled by nationalistic rhetoric on these key states cultivates a desire to stick to their policy guns
on those same interests.
Thus, for the states in the Arctic Council who now have the ability to act upon their
interests in a region they once could not these policy avenues have now opened. Policies related
to economic development, trade route monitoring, Arctic securitization, and resource extraction
all intensified with the introduction of fungibility in both Canada and Russia, quickly becoming
untouchable and more entrenched by the state as the international community to look more
promisingly upon the Arctic.299 The construction of new Arctic military capabilities with the
objective of monitoring and securing coastal trade routes alongside agreements to resolve
territorial disputes bilaterally signal to other states and domestic populations the overall national
interests of the state are being taken to heart and will not be encroached upon. It is important to
note such signaling is occurring within the Arctic waters of every coastal Arctic state and is
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reminiscent of a developing security dilemma in the region, though it is far removed from being
an arms race as argued by media outlets.300
The development of hardline areas of untouchable policies poses a problem for the
inclusion of broader policies proposed or implied by the Arctic Council. The imposition of
barriers on certain issues for the Arctic Council is not an important issue, as the organization was
founded primarily to serve as a regional forum and cooperative scientific framework. Rather, it
inhibits the future growth of the Arctic Council into a true regional forum capable of addressing
every issue within the region while simultaneously reinforcing the nationalistic push towards
certain policy areas seeped in power politics. As the region warms it becomes increasingly
apparent several important issues within the region will become untouchable areas due to their
strong linkages to the national identity of its members.
Arctic Normalization and Its Impacts
Due to its inaccessibility and frigid environment, the Arctic developed its own policy
dynamics and interactive norms in part built off of the other interactions between Arctic states
outside of the region. This is most clearly observed in the policies outlined by Gorbachev in
Murmansk touched upon the Arctic as a unique realm for positive interaction between the Soviet
Union and the United States.301 In this sense, the Arctic cultivated a unique set of policy habits
on the part of the states of its region which at times seem paradoxical, for instance the
cooperation of climate issues and research sharing by states historically diametrically opposed to
one another. Yet, the Arctic Council did not spring fully formed from the head of Zeus, it was
instead the product of a long list of cooperative agreements on the part of every member of the
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Council with the other members and those relationships formed the basis of habit for Arctic
policies.302 Yes, most of the ongoing Arctic territorial disputes were not resolved heading into
1996’s Ottawa Declaration, but the lack of resolution of maritime exclusive economic zones did
not impact the Council’s formation or central goal.303 The development of several other
international institutions which would go on to partner with the Council on its objectives related
to cooperation and environmental study is a testament to the uniqueness of the politics of the
Arctic, and the Council members ability to form cooperative habits with one another on
communal issues.
However, the introduction of sweeping changes in the Arctic environment related to the
reduction of inaccessibility and environmental challenges represents a transformation for the
interactive habits of the Arctic states. Essentially, the inability to act on territorial disputes due to
high costs of Arctic operations and general inaccessibility decreased both the fungibility of
power within the region and international interests within the region. These two factors decrease
on a year to year basis as the Arctic’s sea ice declines, thereby resolving the question of
fungibility and increasing international interests within the Arctic region. Thus the easing costs
of access to the Arctic are serving to alter the fundamental habits which have historically defined
interactions within the Arctic region.
While the creation of these untouchable policy zones is closely tied to the national
identity of the state, the reasoning they are pursued on the governmental level stems from the
overall national interests of the government. In the case of Russia for instance, the creation of
untouchable zones related to its militarization and oil extraction efforts in the Barents Sea are
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closely linked to the desire of the state and populace to return to great power status.304
Meanwhile, in the case of Canadian untouchable zone creation related to disagreements
regarding the nature of the Northwest Passage are much more closely associated with feelings of
the exploitation of Canadian national sovereignty.305 These feelings from these states create
bulwarks which make it difficult for the Arctic Council to effect changes within those states to be
more community oriented, therefore enabling the encroachment of outer-Arctic habits into Arctic
spaces and leading to a normalization of Arctic relationships.
The transformative effects of normalization on the established habits of interaction
among the states of the Arctic region since 1989 have been profound in some areas and more
measured in others. Over the past thirty years those habits most affected by normalization have
been challenged and replaced by new habits of interaction framed by the national identities,
characteristics, and histories of the states calling the Arctic region home. This leads to the
following fours implications regarding the Arctic Council and its institutional effectiveness in the
face of resurgent national identity in a more traversable Arctic; the fungibility of security, habitforming of scientific cooperation, the resource-driven Arctic, and the mythic routes.
Fungibility of Security
As a space for the military operations, the Arctic has only been amenable to ballistic
submarines, monitoring stations, and coast guard operations. However, these habits of limited
military operation are changing as Arctic sea ice shrinks and its thickness lessens. As evident in
the case studies of both Russia and Canada, the operational space in the Arctic is opening wider
with every passing year and this will only continue given the projected temperature increases in
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the region.306 Initially, the habits of the states surrounding the Arctic Ocean in the early years of
the Arctic Council continued to view the Arctic as a strategic space similar to how it was
approached during the Cold War. This meant that the Arctic was used for the stationing of
ballistic submarines and other small scale military support activity due to the prevailing
conditions of significant ice cover making it nearly impossible or costly for other, traditional
military operations.307 The ice sheet further reinforced the costliness of Arctic operations as it
required specialized military equipment to be stationed within the region, further increasing the
costs of Arctic operations and training. However, as the ice sheet has receded the prevailing
habits of Arctic interaction in the 20th century are becoming progressively less applicable.
Rather than creating a new status quo based upon the unique interactions and intense
national identities within the Arctic region though, this has caused a slow spread of extra-Arctic
behaviors to filter into the interactive habits of states in the region. For example, though Russia
possesses the most capable and largest Arctic military forces in the Northern Fleet, the
renovations and expansion of the Northern Fleet can be pointed to as part of the general military
modernization programs Russia has pursued in recent years.308 The fact these forces are capable
in projecting Russian authority into territory currently embroiled in disputes and protecting the
Northeast Passage is propagating traditional security dilemma and trade security spirals normally
observed outside of the Arctic region.309 This build-up of forces on the northernmost coast of
Russia has served as the justification of similar strengthening of Arctic military capabilities by
the Danish, Norwegian, Canadian, and US militaries.310 The purchasing of new military
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hardware for Arctic operations represents the ongoing force of habits from interacting with other
states where power is much more fungible than it is in the Arctic Ocean.
A common thread of the ongoing normalization of militarization is that it has come on in
waves precipitated by the publication of major Arctic climate reports published by the Arctic
Council and its working groups. Yet, it is important to note the states in the Arctic region are not
the only states cultivating interests within the Arctic. Over the past 30 years, several states
including China, India, and Singapore have begun to develop interests in the Arctic region for
the very same reason the Arctic states have, as a consequence they have joined the Arctic
Council as observer states.311 Alongside these actions though, some states have begun to prepare
their militaries for Arctic action or declared the Arctic to be critical to their national interests in
the future, such as China’s declaration of constructing a Polar Silk Road across the Northeast
Passage to access European markets and the development of a small fleet of Chinese
Icebreakers.312 In short, several states from around the globe are beginning to interact within the
Arctic region; thereby, making it increasingly akin to non-Arctic regions where national
identities are present and tempered by institutional effectiveness, mutual dependence, and clever
statesmanship. The clearest current example of such behavior has been the years following the
2014 Ukrainian Crisis. Russian action was met with punitive measures from the West in the
form of boycotts from Canada and the United States in line with how the West habitual interacts
with these kinds of operations.313 Later, sanctions were also applied to Russia as well, yet the
complexities of the relationship between the Arctic states in the Arctic generated cooperation on
critical areas for the Arctic region.314
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In sum, as the Arctic has warmed over the past 30 years it has been ever easier for the
states interested in the region to operationalize their interests. As the case studies have shown
though, the transformative effects of increasing fungibility has only precipitated normalization in
line with other areas of the world in which these states interact, thereby enabling those habits to
begin to intrude on the relationships in the Arctic. Coupled with the increasing nationalistic
rhetoric and continued ice decline it is clear as the region becomes increasingly normalized the
Arctic will shift from a realm of friendly cooperation into a zone of competition similar to other
regions of the world where the competing interests of powerful states collide.
Habitual Scientific Cooperation
The Arctic Council was born from the desire to share scientific resources in order to gain
a better idea about a fragile environment. Over the past 30 years, this scientific cooperation has
remained steadfast in its approach to the region for both of the member states examined in the
case studies. Given the most recent successes of the conservation cooperation in the fall of 2018,
it stands to reason that a new habit for interaction has developed between the Arctic states related
to the Arctic environment. The formation of the habit of scientific cooperation is strongly linked
to the national identities discussed for both Canada and Russia, and scientific cooperation may
be the most robust area of traditional Arctic policy in the face of ongoing regional normalization.
Though for differing reasons, scientific cooperation has remained popular among all of
the members of the Arctic Council, continually leading to improvements within the international
community regarding scientific study of the climate and conservation of unique ecosystems.
Since the founding of the Arctic Council the levels of scientific cooperation have increased
across the whole of the Arctic space and an increased frequency of environmental discussions
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have taken place in order to assist in preserving the Arctic environ.315 It has been the research of
these endeavors, funded by a conglomerate of nations, which produce the research indicating the
shrinking of Arctic ice cover and the need of further action related to conservation,
environmentalism, and regional stewardship.
The national identities of both Russia and Canada in broad congruence with Arctic
Council objectives on conservation in light of ongoing study into the changing Arctic clime, as
the publication of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment in 2004 served to jumpstart several
domestic programs related to environmental conservation in the fragile Arctic environment. In
Russia’s case the cultivation of new environmental laws, legal regimes, and standards pushed
forward state-wide, but a great deal of focus to the Arctic was placed on the Arctic in terms of
fisheries management in the immediate aftermath of the publication of the Assessment.316 For
Canada, the Assessment served to push forward an overhaul of the primary environmental
protection laws and extend Arctic protected areas.317 In this sense, the immediate realization of
shrinking ice sheets prompted a response from state governments to do a more efficient job in
conserving their local environments in line with communal objectives and previously developed
habits.
Given the thirty years of scientific cooperation it stands to reason as ice levels continue to
decline the commitment of the Arctic states to study and conserve the Arctic environment will
either remain steady or increase to meet the challenge. As mentioned previously, the adoption of
the Polar Code by the International Maritime Organization, the continued strengthening of the
environmental laws of Canada and Russia, and the establishment of legally binding resolutions
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like the aforementioned 2018 Agreement To Prevent Unregulated Commercial Fishing on the
High Seas of the Central Arctic Ocean by Arctic Council members have all been predicated by
the actions, research, and coordination offered by Arctic Council members and the working
groups funded by members.318 The persistence of this habit in the face of competing national
goals of Arctic Council members has been due to the congruence of national identity related to
cooperation and conservation efforts within Russia and Canada to broader Arctic Council
objectives. Therefore, it stands to reason as the Arctic continues to warm in the midst of climate
change, so too will the commitment of the states of the Arctic Council to studying and
responding to such changes even if the encroachment of normalization deteriorates other
cooperative opportunities.
The Resource-Driven Arctic
The Arctic has been known to possess a significant amount of reserves of oil and natural
gas capable of enriching the state and investors funding such operations. Thus, the Arctic has
grown to in importance for these resources as it has become less costly to operate in the Arctic
region.319 Importantly though, the intersection of oil extraction and the status of the Arctic as a
realm most readily conceptualized as environmentally fragile leaves commercial efforts to
extract such resources in an interesting position especially in conjunction with ongoing Arctic
normalization.
Historically, there was a significant level of interest in the extraction of oil and natural
gas resources from the Arctic Circle, and this effort to extract resources from the region has been
simmering on the backburner of several states for years. Interest in this kind of develop existed
from a governmental perspective in Russia as early as Gorbachev’s Murmansk declaration and
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Canada has continually pursued policies along similar lines related to approaching the Arctic as
an area for economic exploitation.320 What has prevented the large scale development of oil
extraction facilities has been a combination of the costs of operation, the technological
developments necessary to extract oil from the Arctic Ocean, and the inability to have oil tanks
travel through the Arctic Ocean. Despite these impediments, interest in gaining power and
influence from the extraction of Arctic natural resources fueled discussions within the capitols of
Arctic states, oftentimes outweighing environmental concerns or being tempered by other
environmental legislation or studies from the Arctic Council.321
As previously mentioned, the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment of 2004 made waves
within the international community, because of the interest generated related to the extraction of
offshore oil and natural gas deposits in the region. Essentially, the Assessment proposed the
continuing warming of the Arctic Ocean would reduce costs of operation over time for the
companies willing to extract the resources in the region.322 This sparked a host of government
sponsored or greenlit programs to hunt for oil in the Arctic Ocean from nearly every state with
Arctic coastlines; however, the most significant of these programs would be in Russia’s
extraction efforts in the Barents Sea.323As previously, Rosneft’s Arctic Oil extraction sites have
garnered a great deal of international disdain and condemnation from environmental groups, yet
instead of developing a truly untouchable area for the Arctic Council given these strong national
interests there were considerations regarding marine oil pollution which were utilized in regards
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to the extraction of raw resources.324 Therefore as the deterrents for states to extract Arctic oil
melts away it becomes increasingly normalized to attempt to extract such oil despite the
confrontation of condemnation along environmental grounds.
As the Arctic continues to warm, it becomes increasingly probable for the states
surrounding the region to continue to weigh the costs and benefits in favor of extracting Arctic
Oil. With the decline of the unique environmental barriers and the resurgence of national
interests related to exploiting the Arctic Ocean’s resources, it stands to reason such extraction
attempts will continue despite international condemnation from environmental organizations. In
the case of Russia’s Arctic oil extraction, the only reason its plans for expansion have slowed
have been from the sanctions related to the Ukrainian Crisis limiting investments and
technological assistance from Western firms like Exxon-Mobile.325 Therefore, as the ease of
access in the region grows so too will it become increasingly normalized in relation to the
extraction of oil, and the effects of other areas of global interaction among Arctic States.
As the Arctic continues down its path of normalization and ever-increasing access, the
desire for oil companies to exploit Arctic resources will likely only continue to grow. Though at
odds with other critical areas of national identity for the coastal states of the Arctic, this has not
developed into an untouchable zone for the Arctic Council, instead the Council has remained
dedicated to preparing its members for the possibilities of oil pollution and management in the
High North. This tacit blessing from the Arctic Council regarding oil exploration in the Arctic
region is likely to continue, especially in regarding the amount of national interests on the line
for Arctic Coastal States.
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The Mythic Routes
In the past unresolved territorial disputes have deterred investment into the Arctic region
as investors wish to avoid being embroiled in international incidents where it is unclear.326
Therefore, as the Arctic becomes easier to access then it becomes increasingly necessary for
those disputes to be resolved in order to readily facilitate economic development. Given the
impact of national identity regarding the Arctic over the past 30 years, particularly in areas like
territorial disputes and national sovereignty, it is important to detail how emerging commercial
interests and the habits of the states of the Arctic have meshed together as the sea ice retreats.
There has always been some interest in the Arctic from a commercial shipping
perspective, yet it is important to not though this interest has been dissuaded by costs of
operating in the extreme Arctic climate.327 Nevertheless, companies and states pursued interests
in Arctic trade routes to potentially open them for business.328 For the states themselves, the
potential value of Arctic territory as a trading hub fuels some of the territorial disputes of the
region, despite the difficulty of travel into and out of the region reducing the importance and
visibility of those disputes.329 Thus, the habitual logic of almost ignoring territorial disputes
prevailed and the region was left to its own limited economic devices because of its
inaccessibility.
As sea ice has melted though, the importance of the potential geographic wealth of the
Arctic has been thrust into the limelight of international politics. The continued assessment of the
international community of the value of the trade routes of the region has increased the interest
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of the national governments of Canada and Russia within the region.330 Given the potential
profits to be made for both corporations and state governments, the continued melting of the ice
sheets of the Arctic is correlating with increased ocean travel and increased financing to support
Arctic expeditions for corporate gains.331 Since the publication of the Arctic Climate Impact
Assessment, the Russian government has done its best to help prepare vessels to traverse the
Northeast Passage and projects significant increases in the years to come.332 Meanwhile, Canada
has grown concerned about the national sovereignty of Canadian waterways as the Northwest
Passage becomes increasing viable for shipping traffic.333 For both of these states, the prevailing
habits of interaction regarding these trade routes running along their northern coastlines are
causing those routes to achieve increasing political gravitas for the future their power and putting
new life into ongoing territorial disputes.334 As noted within the case studies the five Arctic
Coastal States agreed to resolve their territorial disputes bilaterally instead of multilaterally in
2008 during the Arctic Coastal Conference.335 Thus, there is a hearty connection between the
ongoing territorial disputes of the region and the economic interests of the states surrounding it
which the Arctic Council has done little to address.
The economic veracity of the Arctic region as a trade hub remains largely unknowable,
due to the costs Arctic operations would continually incur compared to other regions even after
significant portions of sea-ice have receded. As the ice continues to recede, interest in the region
is likely to continue to grow which could exacerbate ongoing territorial disputes.336 As the ice
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continues to melt, these territorial disputes could become exacerbated or serve as the means to
provoke a ready resolution to the territorial issue in order to facilitate increased investment and
commercial stability for states seeking to invest within the Arctic region.

Normalization and the Future of the Arctic Council
The future of the Arctic in the midst of normalization of Arctic relations is one
characterized by the other aspects of the interstate relationships of Arctic states. In other words,
it will be one defined by the already ongoing relationships present in the international
community outside of the Arctic. The Arctic Council has always remained steadfast on its
commitment to limiting its scope of interests to issues relevant to members and where it can
succeed, such as conservation issues and scientific diplomacy yet there are a host of emerging
issues where the Council may be pushed to act.
As normalization continues to affect the relationships of Arctic states and how achievable
the various national interests of those states, the question emerges as to what role would the
Arctic Council have in that new Arctic. The most likely outcome is a similar role to the one it has
now, a regional forum dedicated to heightening Arctic issues and coordinating Arctic climate,
environmental, and conservation research. Ultimately, the fate of the Arctic Council lies with its
member states and their interactions on the issues the Council feels are important. The 2nd
Finnish Chairmanship’s opening statements regarding policy priorities, it is likely the ongoing
direction of the Arctic Council will remain in cooperation on environmental concerns with a
sprinkling of attempts to heighten the visibility of the organization.337 Put differently, Finnish
objectives are not dissimilar from the objectives of previous Chairs including both Canada and
Russia. Still the risk of surges of interest within the domestic politics and identity of Arctic states
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could transform Arctic relations in to be either more confrontational or more cooperative than
outer-Arctic relations.
Initially, in both case studies, there was a significant amount of nationalistic pushes
related to utilizing Arctic resources on the part of both Canada and Russia to benefit themselves
while maintaining conservation goals related to common goods. The prioritization of national
interests over common goods in the region, especially with the amount of speculation related to
economic profits to be made in the region speak to the possibility of an Arctic as unstable as the
projected sea ice cover.338 Building up military forces alongside rhetoric centered on an Arctic
manifest destiny on the part of Arctic states with competing territorial ambitions could hold the
potential for conflict.339 At least these build-ups of military capability could lead to a
destabilizing effect on Arctic politics especially with the ongoing build-up of economic interests
in the region alongside nationalistic rhetoric.340 This though, seems unlikely at the moment and
at any point over the past 30 years of both case studies. As noted in the case studies, these buildups of forces have been related to overhaul programs of the national militaries of the Russian and
Canadian militaries.341 Given these programs reflect global relationships between Russia and the
West, it becomes likely a conflict or contention between the Arctic Coastal States is less likely
than initially believed or considered. Moreover, the continued heighted status of the Arctic
Council in the whole of global politics with its expanding observer status and rotating
chairmanship pushes a cooperative purgative onto the members of the Council, enabling a
discussion of important Arctic objectives on a two year basis involving top ministers from Arctic
states. This reinforces the possibility of a normalization of the Arctic space relative to what it has
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experienced in the past which will not lead to an international conflict or new Cold War, because
those things have not happened since 1989 in the whole of global politics.
On the other end of the spectrum in terms of possible futures for the Arctic and the Arctic
Council is the possibility of a new set of cooperative opportunities for the region because of the
long history of cooperation among members of the Council. As evident in the case studies
though, this cooperation with other Council members is often relegated to one specific set of
issue areas which excludes significant parts of the national interests of states.342 Furthermore,
domestic pressures can force the hands of states to behave in certain ways regarding the Arctic,
from Harper’s statements to protecting Arctic Sovereignty to declarations of the Arctic being the
means to superpower status by Medvedev, thus limiting the cooperative impacts of the Arctic
Council.343 Essentially, there are too many factors pointing to cooperation on some issues while
competition and disagreement prevails in other areas. In essence, what is likely to occur as the
region warms and becomes more accommodating to travel is the transference of habits from
outside of the Arctic, into Arctic politics. For the Arctic Council this bodes rather well, as
cooperation based on environmental factors is popular among its members, and those same
members do not hesitate to engage one another on issues it declares are outside of its jurisdiction,
such as territorial disputes. Thus, while cooperation will persist on issues like conservation,
climate study, pollution management, and search and rescue operations it is unlikely such
cooperation will become the hallmark of every Arctic issue into the future.
With this in mind, the only real option for continued success for the Arctic Council is to
stick to its most successful cooperative programs related to conservation and scientific
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cooperation; thereby, leaving other areas more closely linked to national interests untouched.344
Thus, the future of the Arctic Council likely looks very similar to the present and immediate past
of the Arctic Council, the facilitation of cooperation on certain issues and the ongoing avoidance
of issues which could cause cooperation to breakdown.

344

Young, "The Structure of Arctic Cooperation: Solving Problems/Seizing Opportunities."

103
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS
Over the past 30 years, the Arctic Council has proven itself to be an institution focused
on developing a community of environmentally conscious states working together in order to
better study and preserve one of the most fragile and unique ecosystems on the planet. To this
end, the Arctic Council has successfully enabled countless opportunities of research coordination
across its eight member states, indigenous people’s organizations, observer institutions, and
observer states leading to new international norms related to environmental protection within the
Arctic Ocean.345 The success of these objectives is astounding, and as the case studies regarding
Canadian and Russian policies go to show, likely linked to overall inclinations of the national
identities of the states participating within the Arctic Council.
Yet, national identity also plays a role in limiting the cooperative pushes of the Arctic
Council, holding it back from being a full regional forum to discuss broad spectrum issues within
the region which appear to be becoming increasingly relevant. The encroachment of relations
from outside of the Arctic region perhaps will be able to increasingly normalize the region as the
overall fungibility of national power increases in correlation to the decreases of ice-sheet
thickness. Regardless of how the Arctic will be transformed, it is clear since 1989 the Arctic
Council has had its successes be based upon the national identity and interests of its members
just as it has had its limitations imposed upon it by those same forces.
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